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Abstract—Automatic tools based on symbolic models have been
successful in analyzing security protocols. Such tools are particu-
larly adapted for trace properties (e.g. secrecy or authentication),
while they often fail to analyse equivalence properties.
Equivalence properties can express a variety of security prop-
erties, including in particular privacy properties (vote privacy,
anonymity, untraceability). Several decision procedures have al-
ready been proposed but the resulting tools are rather inefficient.
In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm, based on graph
planning and SAT-solving, which significantly improves the ef-
ficiency of the analysis of equivalence properties. The resulting
implementation, SAT-Equiv, can analyze several sessions where
most tools have to stop after one or two sessions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Formal methods have produced several successful tools for
the automatic analysis of security protocols. Examples of
such tools are ProVerif [1], Avantssar [2], Maude-NPA [3],
Scyther [4], or Tamarin [5]. They have been applied to many
protocols of the literature including e.g. Kerberos and TLS.
However, one type of properties still resists to these tools,
namely privacy properties. Privacy properties incude ballot
privacy (no one should know how I voted), privacy (no one
should know I am here), or unlinkability (no one should be
able to relate two of my transactions). Such properties are
typically expressed as equivalences: an attacker should not be
able to distinguish a session from Alice from one from Bob.
Equivalence properties are harder to analyze than the more
standard authentication or confidentiality properties (expressed
as trace properties). Among the tools mentioned earlier, only
ProVerif, Maude-NPA and Tamarin may handle equivalences.
Tamarin often requires user interaction for equivalence prop-
erties. Maude-NPA [6] often does not terminate when used for
equivalence properties. Since checking equivalence properties
for an unbounded number of sessions is undecidable [7],
ProVerif may of course also fail. This is in particular the case
when the order of the protocol rules matters or when some
step may be executed at most once.
The alternative is to decide equivalence, for a bounded num-
ber of sessions. Several procedures have been proposed [8]–
[10], often with a companion tool: Akiss [10], Spec [9],
Apte [11]. Unfortunately, these tools have a very limited
practical impact because they scale badly. Analyzing one
session typically requires several seconds and the analysis of
two sessions is often unreachable, although the tools Apte and
Akiss have recently improved their efficiency through the use
of Partial Order Reduction (POR) techniques [12], [13]. It
is interesting to note that considering one or two sessions is
not sufficient to explore all standard attack scenarios (where
each participant may engage a session with an honest or a
dishonest agent and may be involved in any role). For example,
in the case of a three-party protocol, with a trusted server, 6
sessions have to be considered to cover all possible scenarios
with two honest agents A, B and a dishonest one C (A talking
to B, A talking to C, and C talking to B, and three additional
sessions where the role of the agents A and B are swapped).
Assuming that dishonest roles do not need to be modelled, this
leads to a scenario with 14 roles in parallel. In practice, an
attack does not require 14 sessions. 3-4 sessions are typically
sufficient. However, it is impossible to predict which scenario
is required for the attack. Moreover, since the problem of
deciding equivalence is actually undecidable, an attack may
require an arbitrary number of sessions. Therefore, the more
sessions we can check, the more confidence we obtain.
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose a different
procedure for deciding equivalence. Instead of designing a
crafted algorithm for equivalence, we use more general verifi-
cation techniques, namely Graph planning [14], [15] and SAT-
solving. The idea of using Graph planning and SAT-solvers for
analyzing protocols has already been explored in [16], yielding
the tool SATMC [17] for trace properties. Moving from trace
to equivalence properties is far from being straightforward as
exemplified by the research effort on equivalence these past
10 years (see e.g. [18] for a survey).
Let us first sketch how SATMC works. The tool focuses
at secrecy and encodes accessibility of a (secret) term into a
SAT formula. For efficiency reasons, the main step of SATMC
actually consists in applying Graph planning techniques in or-
der to compute an over-approximation of reachable messages.
If no secret has been found, the protocol is deemed secure.
Otherwise, actual accessibility of the potentially leaked secret
is encoded into a SAT formula.
In order to benefit from Graph planning and SAT-solvers,
the size of messages has to be bounded and this bound needs to
be practical. In [16], [17], the authors simply assume protocols
to be given with a (finite) format for the messages. Here, we
do not bound a priori the format of the messages. Instead,
we rely on a recent result [19] that shows that if there is
an attack, that is a witness of non equivalence between two
protocols P and Q, then there is a “small” attack, where
messages comply to a certain format (induced by a type).
This result holds for deterministic protocols that use symmetric
keys and pairing. Note that this result only controls the format
of the messages exchanged in P , not in Q (or conversely).
The fact that the messages in Q are a priori unbounded
forbids any direct encoding of (non) equivalence into a SAT
formula. Planning graphs are particularly helpful here: while
computing an over-approximation of the messages reachable
in P , we simultaneously obtained an over-approximation of
the messages that need to be considered in Q for checking
equivalence w.r.t. P . This requires of course to characterize
(non) equivalence as a reachability property, which is made
possible thanks to the protocols’ determinism.
In order to further reduce the traces than need to be
explored, we show that we can restrict ourselves to an attacker
that only decompose messages (and do not compose them),
provided that protocols are flattened, that is all meaningful
composition steps are pre-computed in advance. This flattening
technique has been used in [16] (although we are not aware of
any proof of correction). We formally prove this technique to
be sound, in the more general case of equivalence properties.
Handling equivalence is non trivial since it is not sufficient
to preserve the set of messages that can be computed, it is
also necessary to preserve cases of failure on both processes.
Moreover, we had use one more ingredient to obtain an effi-
cient bound. We significantly reduce the number of constants
that need to be considered to find an attack. Namely, we show
that only two constants are necessary, which is a result of
independent interest.
Implementation. We have implemented our algorithm and
our first experimentations demonstrate the good performance
of our tool. For most protocols, we can easily analyse several
sessions while the three other tools (Akiss, Spec, Apte) typi-
cally fail for more than one session, with the exception of the
variant Apte-por [13], which can handle several sessions, in
some cases. All files related to the tool implementation and
case studies are available at [20].
II. MODEL FOR SECURITY PROTOCOLS
A common framework for modelling security protocols are
process algebra like the applied pi-calculus [21]. We consider
here a variant of the calculus provided in [19] in order to
benefit from its main result, which guarantees a “small attack”
property: when there is an attack, there is a well-typed attack.
A. Syntax
Term algebra: As usual, messages are modelled by terms.
We consider an infinite set of names N , an infinite set of con-
stants Σ0, and two distinct sets of variables X and W . Names
are typically used to represent keys or nonces. Variables in X
refer to unknown parts of messages expected by participants
while variables in W are used to store messages learnt by the
attacker. We consider the following sets of function symbols:
Σc = {enc, 〈 〉} Σd = {dec, proj1, proj2} Σstd = Σc ∪ Σd
The symbol enc and dec both of arity 2 represent encryp-
tion and decryption. Concatenation of messages is modelled
through the symbol 〈 〉 of arity 2, with projection func-
tions proj1 and proj2 of arity 1. We distinguish between
constructor symbols in Σc and destructor symbols in Σd.
We consider several sets of terms. Given a set of A of
atoms (i.e. names, variables, and constants), and a signature
F ∈ {Σc,Σd,Σstd}, we denote by T (F ,A) the set of
terms built from F and A. Constructors terms with atomic
encryptions are represented by the set T0(Σc,A), which is the
subset of T (Σc,A) such that any subterm enc(m, k) of a term
in T0(Σc,A) is such that k ∈ A. Given Σ ⊆ Σ0, we denote by
MΣ the set T0(Σc,Σ∪N ), i.e. the set of messages built using
constants in Σ. The positions of a term are defined as usual.
We denote vars(u) the set of variables that occur in u. The
application of a substitution σ to a term u is written uσ, and
we denote dom(σ) its domain, and img(σ) its image. Two
terms u1 and u2 are unifiable when there exists σ such that
u1σ = u2σ. In this case, we denote mgu their most general
unifier. The composition of two substitutions σ1 and σ2 is
denoted σ1 ◦ σ2.
Example 1: Let kab and kbs be two names in N , and a be
a constant from Σ0. We have that t = enc(〈kab, a〉, kas) is a
message from MΣ0 , whereas enc(a, 〈kas, kas〉) is not (due to
the presence of a compound term in key position).
An attacker can build any term by applying function sym-
bols. His computation is formally modelled by terms, called
recipes. Given Σ ⊆ Σ0, we denote RΣ the set T (Σstd,Σ∪W),
i.e. the set of recipes built using constants in Σ. Note that a
recipe does not contain names, since, intuitively, names are
initially secret.
Example 2: Assume that the attacker has first intercepted
the message t (stored in w1), and then the key kas (stored
in w2). The term R = proj1(dec(w1,w2)) is a recipe that
represents a computation that can be performed by the attacker.
Indeed, he can decrypt the first message with the second one,
and then apply a projection operator.
The decryption of an encryption with the right key yields the
plaintext. Similarly, the left (or right) projection of a concate-
nation yields the left (or right) component. These properties
are reflected in the three following convergent rewrite rules:
dec(enc(x, y), y) → x, and proji(〈x1, x2〉) → xi i ∈ {1, 2}.
A term u can be rewritten in v if there is a position p
in u, and a rewriting rule g(t1, . . . , tn) → t such that
u|p = g(t1, . . . , tn)θ for some substitution θ. Moreover, we
assume that t1θ, . . . , tnθ as well as tθ are messages. This
assumption slightly differs from [19]. Here, whenever an inner
decryption/projection fails then the overall evaluation fails.
Intuitively, we model eager evaluation while [19] models
lazy evaluation. Our rewriting system is convergent, and we
denote u↓ the normal form of a given term u.
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Example 3: Let t be the term given in Example 1, we have
that proj1(dec(t, kas))↓ = kab. Indeed, we have that:
proj1(dec(t, kas)) = proj1(dec(enc(〈kab, a〉, kas), kas))
→ proj1(〈kab, a〉)
→ kab
Process algebra: We only consider public channels and
we assume that each process communicates on a dedicated
channel. In practice, an attacker can typically distinguish be-
tween protocol participants thanks to their IP address and even
between protocol sessions thanks to session identifiers. Techni-
cally, this assumption avoids non determinism. Formally, we
assume an infinite set Ch of channels and we consider the
fragment of simple processes without replication built on basic
processes as defined e.g. in [22]. A basic process represents
a party in a protocol, which may sequentially perform actions
such as waiting for a message of a certain form, and outputting
a message. Then, a simple process is a parallel composition
of such basic processes playing on distinct channels.
Definition 1: The set of basic processes on c ∈ Ch is defined
as follows (with u1, u2 ∈ T (Σc,Σ0 ∪ N ∪ X )):
P,Q := 0 | in(c, u1).P | out(c, u2).P
A simple process P = {P1, . . . , Pn} is a multiset of basic
processes Pi on pairwise distinct channels ci.
The process 0 does nothing. The process “in(c, u1).P ”
expects a message m of the form u1 on channel c and
then behaves like Pσ where σ is a substitution such that
m = u1σ is a message. The process “out(c, u2).P ” emits u2
on channel c, and then behaves like P . We assume that names
are implicitly freshly generated, and therefore we do need a
specific action to model name generation. The construction
“new” is important in the presence of replication but we do not
consider replication here. For the sake of clarity, we may omit
the null process. We write fv (P ) for the set of free variables
that occur in P , i.e. the set of variables that are not in the
scope of an input.
Definition 2: A protocol is a simple process P that is
ground, i.e. fv (P) = ∅.
Example 4: The Denning Sacco protocol [23] (without
timestamps) is a key distribution protocol using symmetric
encryption and a trusted server. Informally, we have:
1. A→ S : A,B
2. S → A : {B,Kab, {Kab, A}Kbs}Kas
3. A→ B : {Kab, A}Kbs
where {m}k denotes the symmetric encryption of a mes-
sage m with key k. The agents A and B aim at authenticating
each other and establishing a session key Kab through a trusted
server S. The key Kas (resp. Kbs) is a long term key shared
between A and S (resp. B and S).
To model the Denning Sacco protocol, we introduce several
atomic data: kas, kbs, kab are names, a and b are constants
from Σ0, and c1, c2, and c3 are channel names from Ch. Each
role is modelled by a basic process that is described below.
Below, we denote by 〈x1, x2, x3〉 the term 〈x1, 〈x2, x3〉〉.
PA = out(c1, 〈a, b〉).
in(c1, enc(〈b, xAB , xB〉, kas)).
out(c1, xB)
PS = in(c2, 〈a, b〉).
out(c2, enc(〈b, kab, enc(〈kab, a〉, kbs)〉, kas))
PB = in(c3, enc(〈yAB , a〉, kbs))
The protocol is then modelled by the simple ground process
PDS = {PA, PS , PB}. In order to model several sessions of the
same protocol, we simply have to consider several instances
of the basic processes PA, PS , and PB . We will use different
channel names to get a simple process, different names to
model fresh names, and we will rename variables to avoid
clashes. Two sessions of the Denning-Sacco protocol (between
honest participants) are therefore modelled by:
P ′DS = {PA, PS , PB, P
′
A, P
′
S , P
′
B}
where P ′A, P
′
B , and P
′
S are given below:
P ′A = out(c4, 〈a, b〉).
in(c4, enc(〈b, x′AB , x
′
B〉, kas)).
out(c4, x
′
B)
P ′S = in(c5, 〈a, b〉).
out(c5, enc(〈b, k′ab, enc(〈k
′
ab, a〉, kbs)〉, kas))
P ′B = in(c6, enc(〈y
′
AB , a〉, kbs))
B. Semantics
The operational semantics of a process is defined using a
relation over configurations, i.e. triples (P ;φ;σ) where:
• P is a multiset of processes with fv (P) ⊆ dom(σ);
• φ is a frame, i.e. a substitution of the form
{w1 ⊲ m1, . . . ,wn ⊲ mn}
where w1, . . . ,wn ∈ W , and m1, . . . ,mn ∈ MΣ0 ;
• σ is a substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ X , and
img(σ) ⊆ MΣ0 .
We often write P instead of (P ; ∅; ∅), and P ∪ P instead
of {P} ∪ P . The terms in φ represent the messages that are
sent out and therefore known by the attacker whereas the
substitution σ is used to store parts of the messages received
so far. The operational semantics of a process is induced by
the relation
α
−→ over configurations defined below:
IN
(in(c, u).P ∪ P ; φ; σ)
in(c,R)
−−−−→ (P ∪ P ; φ; σ ⊎ σ0)
where R ∈ RΣ0 such that Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 ,
and Rφ↓ = (uσ)σ0 for σ with dom(σ0) = vars(uσ).
OUT
(out(c, u).P ∪ P ; φ; σ)
out(c,w)
−−−−−→ (P ∪ P ; φ ∪ {w ⊲ uσ}; σ)
with w a fresh variable from W , and uσ ∈ MΣ0 .
A process may input any term that an attacker can built from
publicly available terms and symbols (rule IN). The second
rule corresponds to the output of a term: the corresponding
term is added to the frame of the current configuration, which
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means that the attacker has now access to it. Note that the
term is outputted provided that it is a message. In case the
evaluation of the term yields an encryption with a non atomic
key, the evaluation fails and there is no output. We do not need
to model internal communications since we assume public
channels: all communications are controlled by the attacker.
The relation
tr
−→ between configurations (where tr is a
possibly empty sequence of actions) is defined in the usual
way. Given Σ ⊆ Σ0, and a protocol P we define its set of
traces w.r.t. Σ as follows:
traceΣ(P) = {(tr, φ) | (P ; ∅; ∅)
tr
−→ (P ′;φ;σ)
for some configuration (P ′;φ;σ)
and any recipe occurring in tr is in RΣ.}.
Note that, for any (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(P), we have that trφ↓
only contains messages in MΣ0 .
Example 5: Consider the following sequence tr:
tr = out(c1,w1).in(c2,w1).out(c2,w2).
in(c1,w2).out(c1,w3).in(c3,w3)
This sequence tr allows one to reach the frame:
φ = {w1 ⊲ 〈a, b〉, w2 ⊲ enc(〈b, kab, enc(〈kab, a〉, kbs)〉, kas),
w3 ⊲ enc(〈kab, a〉, kbs) }.
We have that (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(PDS). This trace corresponds to
a normal execution of the protocol.
C. Trace equivalence
Trace equivalence can be used to formalise many interesting
security properties, in particular privacy-type properties. We
assume keys to be atomic and encryption to fail for non atomic
keys. We define trace equivalence accordingly, by letting the
attacker observe when an encryption fails. We first define
equivalence on sequences of messages.
Definition 3: A frame φ1 is statically included w.r.t.
Σ ⊆ Σ0 in a frame φ2, denoted φ1 ⊑s φ2, when we have
that dom(φ1) = dom(φ2), and:
• for any R ∈ RΣ, Rφ1↓ ∈ MΣ0 implies that Rφ2↓ ∈
MΣ0 ;
• for any R1, R2 ∈ RΣ with R1φ1↓, R2φ1↓ ∈ MΣ0 ,
R1φ1↓ = R2φ1↓ implies that R1φ2↓ = R2φ2↓.
They are in static equivalence w.r.t. Σ, denoted φ1 ∼s φ2,
when φ1 ⊑s φ2, and φ2 ⊑s φ1 (both w.r.t. Σ).
Example 6: Consider φ1 = φ ∪ {w4 ⊲ enc(m1, kab)} and
φ2 = φ ∪ {w4 ⊲ enc(m2, k)} where φ has been introduced in
Example 5. The terms m1, m2 are public constants from Σ0,
and k is a name from N . We have that the two frames φ1
and φ2 are statically equivalent (w.r.t. any Σ). Intuitively, at
the end of a normal execution between honest participants, an
attacker can not distinguish whether the key used to encrypt
a message (here the constants m1 and m2) is the session key
that has been established or a fresh key k.
In contrast, the frames φ′1 = φ1 ∪ {w5 ⊲ kab} and φ
′
2 =
φ2 ∪ {w5 ⊲ kab} are not in static equivalence. Actually φ′1 is
not statically included in φ′2. Indeed, an attacker can observe
that the 4th message of φ1 can be decrypted by the 5
th message,
which is not the case in φ′2. Formally, considering R =
dec(w4,w5), we have Rφ
′
1↓ ∈ MΣ0 while Rφ
′
2↓ /∈ MΣ0 .
Then, we lift this notion of equivalence from frames to
configurations.
Definition 4: Let Σ ⊆ Σ0. A protocol P is trace included
w.r.t. Σ in a protocol Q, written P ⊑t Q, if for every
(tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(P), there exists (tr′, ψ) ∈ traceΣ(Q) such
that tr = tr′ and φ ⊑s ψ w.r.t. Σ. The protocols P and Q
are trace equivalent w.r.t. Σ, written P ≈t Q, if P ⊑t Q
and Q ⊑t P (both w.r.t. Σ).
This notion of equivalence (even when Σ = Σ0) does not
coincide in general with the usual notion of trace equivalence
as defined e.g. in [22]. It is actually coarser since we simply
require the resulting frames to be in static inclusion (φ ⊑s ψ)
instead of static equivalence (φ ∼s ψ). However, these two
notions actually coincide (see [10]) for the class of simple
processes that we consider in this paper.
Assume given two protocols P and Q such that P 6⊑t Q
w.r.t. Σ. A witness of this non-inclusion is a trace tr w.r.t. Σ
for which there exists φ such that (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(P) and:
• either there is no ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ traceΣ(Q);
• or such ψ exists and φ 6⊑s ψ w.r.t. Σ.
Note that for a simple process, once the sequence tr is fixed,
the resulting frame reachable through tr is uniquely defined
(when it exists) since simple processes are deterministic.
Example 7: The protocol P ′DS presented in Example 4
models two sessions of the Denning Sacco protocol. Assume
now that we wish to check strong secrecy of the exchanged
key, as received by the agent A. This can be expressed by
checking whether P ′1DS ≈t P
′2
DS where:
• P ′1DS is as P
′
DS but we add “out(c1, enc(m1, xAB))” at
the end of the process PA, and “out(c4, enc(m1, x
′
AB))”
at the end of P ′A
• P2DS is as PDS but we add the instruction
“out(c1, enc(m2, k))” at the end of PA, and
“out(c4, enc(m2, k
′))” at the end of P ′A.
The terms m1 and m2 are two public constants from Σ0
whereas k and k′ are names from N .
While the key received by A cannot be learnt by an attacker,
strong secrecy of this key is not guaranteed. Indeed, due to
the lack of freshness, the same key can be sent several times
to A, and this can be observed by an attacker. Formally, the
attack is as follows. Consider the sequence
tr′ = tr · out(c4,w4).in(c4,w2).out(c4,w5).
out(c1,w6).out(c4,w7)
where tr has been defined in Example 5. The attacker simply
replays an old session. The resulting (unique) frames are
• φ′1 = φ ∪ φ
′ ∪ {w6 ⊲ enc(m1, kab), w7 ⊲ enc(m1, kab)},
• φ′2 = φ ∪ φ
′ ∪ {w6 ⊲ enc(m2, k), w7 ⊲ enc(m2, k′)}
where φ is the frame given in Example 5, and
φ′ = {w4 ⊲ 〈a, b〉,w5 ⊲ enc(〈kab, a〉, kbs)}.
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We have that (tr′, φ′1) ∈ traceΣ0(P
′1
DS) and (tr
′, φ′2) ∈
traceΣ0(P
′2
DS). However, we have that φ
′
1 6⊑s φ
′
2 since w6 =
w7 in φ
′
1 but not in φ
′
2. Thus P
′1
DS is not trace included
in P ′2DS. To avoid this attack, the messages of the Denning-
Sacco protocol shall include timestamps or nonces.
The goal of the paper is to provide an efficient and practical
procedure for checking trace equivalence.
III. REDUCTION RESULTS
Even when considering finite processes (i.e. processes with-
out replication), the problem of checking trace equivalence is
difficult due to several sources of unboundedness:
• the size of messages which can be forged by an attacker
is unbounded;
• the number of nonces and constants that can be used by
an attacker is unbounded too.
Recently, [19] has established how to reduced the search
space for attacks by bounding the size of messages involved
in a minimal attack. From a theoretical point of view, this also
yields a bound on the number of nonces/constants involved
in such a minimal attack. However, this bound is far from
being practical. In this section, we show that the small attack
property of [19] still holds even if our semantics has slightly
changed (due to eager evaluation) and we further demonstrate
that the number of constants can be significantly reduced since
only three constants need to be considered (and no nonces),
in addition to those explicitly mentioned in the protocol.
A. Bounding the size of messages
As in [19], we consider type-compliant protocols, and we
restrict ourselves to typing systems that preserve the structure
of terms. A typing system is defined as follows.
Definition 5: A typing system is a pair (T0, δ0) where T0
is a set of elements called atomic types with a special atomic
type denoted τ⋆, and δ0 is a function mapping atomic terms in
Σ0∪N ∪X to types τ generated using the following grammar:
τ, τ1, τ2 = τ0 | 〈τ1, τ2〉 | enc(τ1, τ2) with τ0 ∈ T0.
We further assume the existence of an infinite number of
constants in Σ0 (resp. variables in X , names in N ) of any type,
and the existence of three special constants denoted c〈ω,ω〉, c
0
⋆,
and c1⋆ of type τ⋆. The constant c〈ω,ω〉 can not be used in key
position. Then, δ0 is extended to constructor terms as follows:
δ0(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(δ0(t1), . . . , δ0(tn)) with f ∈ Σc.
Example 8: Continuing our running Example, we con-
sider the typing system generated from the set TDS =
{τa, τm, τks, τk} of atomic types and the function δDS that
associates the expected type to each constant/name, and the
following types to variables:
• δDS(xAB) = δDS(x
′
AB) = δDS(yAB) = δDS(y
′
AB) = τk;
• δDS(xB) = δDS(x
′
B) = enc(〈τk, τa〉, τks).
A protocol is type-compliant if two unifiable subterms have
the same type. Formally, we use the definition given in [19],
which is similar to the one introduced in [24].
We write St(t) (resp. St(τ)) for the set of (syntactic)
subterms of a term t (resp. type τ ), and ESt(t) the set of
its encrypted subterms, i.e.
ESt(t) = {u ∈ St(t) | u is of the form enc(u1, u2)}.
In the following definition, δP(P ) is the set of δP(t) for
every term t occuring in protocol P .
Definition 6: A protocol P is type-compliant w.r.t. a typing
system (TP , δP) if τ⋆ 6∈ St(δP(P)), and for every t, t′ ∈
ESt(P) we have that:
t and t′ unifiable implies that δP(t) = δP(t
′).
Example 9: The protocol P ′1DS (resp. P
′2
DS) is type-compliant
w.r.t. the typing system given in Example 8. Indeed, the
encrypted subterms of P ′1DS are:
1) tA = enc(〈b, xAB , xB〉, kas);
2) tB1 = enc(〈yAB , a〉, kbs);
3) tB2 = enc(m1, yAB);
4) tS1 = enc(〈b, kab, enc(〈kab, a〉, kbs)〉, kas);
5) tS2 = enc(〈kab, a〉, kbs)
as well as the renaming of these terms obtained by replac-
ing kab, xAB , yAB , and xB with fresh names/variables of the
same type, namely k′ab, x
′
AB , y
′
AB , and x
′
B .
It is easy to check that the type-compliance condition is
satisfied for any pair of terms. For instance, we have that tA
and tS1 are unifiable, and they have indeed the same type:
δDS(tA) = enc(〈τa, τk, enc(〈τk, τa〉, τks)〉, τks) = δDS(tS1).
Consider a protocol P that is type-compliant w.r.t. to a
typing system (TP , δP), an execution P
tr
−→ (P ′;φ′;σ′) is
well-typed if σ′ is a well-typed substitution, i.e. every variable
of its domain has the same type as its image. We say that
a trace (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(P) is well-typed if its underlying
execution (unique due to the class of protocols we consider in
this paper) is well-typed. Given a protocol P , we denote ΣP
the constants from Σ0 that occur in P .
We first show that the small attack property from [19] still
holds: whenever two processes are not in trace equivalence,
then there is a well-typed witness of non equivalence. In
addition, we show that the recipes involved in such a trace
have a simple form: they are built using constructor symbols
on top of destructors.
Definition 7: Let R be a recipe. We say that R is destructor-
only if R ∈ T (Σd,Σ∪W). It is simple if there exist destructor-
only recipes R1, . . . , Rk, and a context C made of constructors
such that R = C[R1, . . . , Rk].
Theorem 1: Let P be a protocol type-compliant w.r.t.
(TP , δP) and Q be another protocol. We have that P 6⊑t Q
w.r.t. Σ0 if, and only if, there exists a witness tr of this non-
inclusion that only contains simple recipes and such that one
of the following holds:
1) (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ0(P) for some φ and (tr, φ) is well-
typed w.r.t. (TP , δP);
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2) tr = tr′{c0 7→ c〈ω,ω〉} for some c0 ∈ Σ0 r ΣP , and
(tr′, φ′) ∈ traceΣ0(P) for some φ
′ and (tr′, φ′) is well-
typed w.r.t. (TP , δP).
Since we consider atomic keys, some execution may fail
when a protocol is about to output an encryption with a non
atomic key. In order to detect this kind of behaviours, it is
important to consider slightly ill-typed traces as defined in
Item 2.
Example 10: Continuing our running example, we have
seen that P ′1DS 6⊑t P
′2
DS. The witness tr
′ of this non-inclusion
(given in Example 7) only contains simple recipes, and
(tr′, φ′1) ∈ traceΣ0(P
′1
DS) is well-typed w.r.t. (TDS, δDS) (the
typing system given in Example 8).
B. Bounding the number of constants
The previous result implicitly bounds the number of con-
stants used in an attack but the induced bound would be
impractical. We show here that actually, two constants are
sufficient. The proof technique is inspired from [25] and [26]
which respectively reduce the number of nonces and agents
in the context of equivalence properties. A direct application
of the proof technique would however yield two constants of
each type, which represents still a high number of constants.
Instead, we show here that just two constants are enough,
provided they are of special type τ⋆. To obtain this result,
we slightly relax the notion of well-typedness.
Given a typing system (T0, δ0), we denote by  the smallest
relation on types defined as follows:
• τ⋆  τ and τ  τ for any type τ (atomic or not);
• f(τ1, τ2)  f(τ ′1, τ
′
2) when τ1  τ
′
1, τ2  τ
′
2, and f ∈ Σc.
Consider a protocol P that is type-compliant w.r.t. to a
typing system (TP , δP), an execution P
tr
−→ (P ′;φ′;σ′) is
quasi-well-typed if δP(xσ
′)  δP(x) for every variable
x ∈ dom(σ′). We say that a trace (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(P) is quasi-
well-typed if its underlying execution (unique due to the class
of protocols we consider in this paper) is quasi-well-typed.
If two processes are not in trace equivalence, then there is
a witness of non equivalence that is quasi-well typed and uses
at most two extra constants plus eventually c〈ω,ω〉 to detect
slightly ill-typed traces.
Theorem 2: Let P be a protocol type-compliant w.r.t.
(TP , δP) and Q be another protocol. Let Σ = ΣP ⊎
{c0⋆, c
1
⋆, c〈ω,ω〉}. We have that P 6⊑t Q w.r.t. Σ0 if, and only if,
there exists a witness tr of this non-inclusion w.r.t. Σ that only
contains simple recipes, and such that (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(P) for
some φ and (tr, φ) is quasi-well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP).
Intuitively, we can show that non equivalence relies on at
most one disequality, and thanks to our equational theory,
only two constants c0⋆, c
1
⋆ are necessary to produce such a
disequality.
IV. FROM STATIC EQUIVALENCE TO PLANNING
The overall objective of this paper is to provide a practi-
cal algorithm for deciding trace equivalence, using planning
graphs and SAT-solving. We start here with the static case and
show how to reduce static equivalence to a planning problem.
Given two frames, we show how to build a planning problem
such that the planning problem has a solution if, and only if,
the two corresponding frames are not in static equivalence.
We consider two frames φ and ψ having same domain. We
denote Σ the constants from Σ0 that occur either in φ or in ψ.
A. Planning problems
We first recall the definition of a planning problem, slightly
simplified from [27]. Intuitively, a planning system defines a
transition system from sets of facts to sets of facts. New facts
may be produced and some old facts may be deleted.
Definition 8: A planning system is tuple 〈Fact, Init,Rule〉
where Fact is a set of variable-free atomic formulas called
facts, Init0 ⊆ Fact is a set of facts representing the initial
state, and Rule is a set of rules of the form:
Pre −→ Add ;Del
where Pre , Add , Del are finite sets of facts such that Add ∩
Del = ∅, Del ⊆ Pre. We write Pre −→ Add when Del = ∅.
Given a rule r ∈ Rule of the form Pre −→ Add ;Del , we
denote Pre(r) = Pre , Add(r) = Add , and Del(r) = Del .
Moreover, if S ⊆ Fact are such that Pre(r) ⊆ S, then we
say that the rule is applicable in S, denoted S
r
−→ S′, and the
state S′ = (S r Del) ∪ Add is the state resulting from the
application of r to S. A planning path from S0 ⊆ Fact to
Sn ⊆ Fact is a sequence of rules r1, . . . , rn ∈ Rule such
that there exist states S1, . . . , Sn−1 ⊆ Fact such that:
S0
r1−→ S1
r2−→ . . . Sn−1
rn−→ Sn
A planning problem for a system Θ = 〈Fact, Init,Rule〉
is a pair Π = 〈Θ, Sf 〉 where Sf ⊆ Fact represents the target
facts. A solution to Π = 〈Θ, Sf 〉, called a plan, is a planning
path from Init to a state Sn such that Sf ⊆ Sn.
In this paper, we consider an (infinite) set of facts Fact0
that consists of:
• all atomic formulas of the form att(uP , uQ) with
uP , uQ ∈ MΣ;
• all atomic formulas of the form statecP,Q(σP , σQ) where
c ∈ Ch, P,Q are basic processes on channel c, and σP
(resp. σQ) is a grounding substitution for P (resp. Q);
• a special symbol bad.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the reduction of
static equivalence to the (non) existence of a solution of a
planning system. Therefore, we will consider planning systems
with facts that represent the attacker’s knowledge, i.e. those
of the form att(uP , uQ) (plus the symbol bad). Later on, in
Section V, we will additionally consider the facts of the form
statecP,Q(σP , σQ) that model internal states of the agents.
B. Attacker rules
We first describe the planning rules that correspond to the
attacker behaviours. Instead of considering rules on ground
facts, we start by describing a set of abstract rules that we
instantiated later on, yielding a (concrete) planning system.
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The attacker behaviour is modelled by the following set RuleA
of abstract rules:
att(〈x1, x2〉, 〈y1, y2〉) −→ att(x1, y1)
att(〈x1, x2〉, 〈y1, y2〉) −→ att(x2, y2)
att(enc(x1, x2), enc(y1, y2)), att(x2, y2) −→ att(x1, y1)
Note that there is no Del since the attacker never forgets.
Interestingly, the rules only model decomposition There is no
rule to synthesize messages. In general, this would be unsound
but we will show why we can get rid of synthesis rules, thanks
to the flattening technique. This is a key point of our algorithm
to avoid building large terms.
We now explain how to obtain concrete planning rules from
the abstract ones. This step is called concretization. Basically,
we distinguish two kinds of concrete rules: the positive one,
and the negative one. We start in this subsection by defining
the positive one.
Given an abstract attacker rule r ∈ RuleA, we define its
positive concretizations by simply instantiating the abstract
rules such that the resulting terms are messages.
Concrete+(r) = {rσ | σ a substitution grounding for r
such that rσ only involve messages in MΣ}
Let φ and ψ be two frames with dom(φ) = dom(ψ). The
set of facts associated to φ and ψ is defined as the set of
couples of all identical constants and the couples of associated
messages of the two frames.
Fact(φ, ψ) =
{att(a, a) | a ∈ Σ} ∪ {att(wφ,wψ) | w ∈ dom(φ)}
It is easy to show that, applying (concrete) attacker rules to
Fact(φ, ψ), we compute the set of couples (u, v) that can be
reached by applying destructor-only recipes to φ and ψ.
Lemma 1: Let φ, ψ be two frames with dom(φ) = dom(ψ).
Let Θ = 〈Fact0,Fact(φ, ψ),Concrete
+(RuleA)〉 and Π =
〈Θ, {att(u, v)}〉 for some u, v ∈ MΣ. We have that Π has
a solution if, and only if, there is a destructor-only recipe
R ∈ RΣ such that Rφ↓ = u, and Rψ↓ = v.
C. Case of failures
To break static equivalence, an attacker may build new
terms but also check for equalities and computation failures.
Therefore, we encode when a computation can be performed
on the right hand side but can not be mimicked on the left.
We say that a fact f = att(u0, v0) (u0, v0 ∈ MΣ) left-
unifies (resp. right-unifies) with att(u, v) if there exists σ
such that uσ = u0 (resp. vσ = v0). Similarly, a sequence of
facts att(u1, v1), . . . , att(uk, vk) left-unifies with a sequence
att(u′1, v
′
1), . . . , att(u
′
k, v
′
k) if there exists σ such that u
′
1σ =
u1, . . . , u
′
kσ = uk (and symmetrically for right-unification).
Given an abstract attacker rule r = Pre −→ Add (note that
Del is empty for attacker rule), we define Concrete−(r) as
the set of concrete planning rules that contains:
f1, . . . , fk −→ bad
for any sequence of facts f1, . . . , fk ∈ Fact0 such that
f1, . . . , fk left-unifies with Pre , whereas f1, . . . , fk does not
right-unify with Pre . This is the generic way to compute the
failure rules from abstract attacker rules. In case of the set
of abstract rules RuleA that we consider here, we obtain the
following infinite set of rules, denoted Concrete−(RuleA):
att(〈u1, u2〉, v) −→ bad
for any u1, u2, v ∈ MΣ such that v is not a pair
att(enc(u1, u2), v), att(u2, v
′) −→ bad
for any u1, u2, v, v
′ ∈ MΣ such that enc(u1, u2) ∈ MΣ,
and dec(v, v′)↓ 6∈ MΣ.
In order to capture static inclusion, we have to consider
some additional cases of failure, in particular those corre-
sponding to an equality that holds in one side but not in the
other side. For this, we introduce the set Rtestfail :
Rtestfail = {att(u, v1), att(u, v2) −→ bad | v1 6= v2}
However, as exemplified below, due to the absence of rule
to compose terms, this is not sufficient.
Example 11: Let φ = {w ⊲ k} and ψ = {w ⊲ enc(s, k)}
where s, k ∈ N . We have that φ 6⊑s ψ. Indeed, consider
R = enc(w,w), we have that Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ whereas Rψ↓ 6∈
MΣ. However, we have no mean to witness this non-inclusion
without relying on synthesis rules (that we do not have).
Therefore, we introduce in addition the ability to check
whether a message is an atom or not (different from the
special constant c〈ω,ω〉). More formally, we consider the set:
Ratomfail = {att(u, v) −→ bad | u is an atom different
from c〈ω,ω〉 but not v}
Given a set Rule of abstract rules, we denote
Concrete(Rule) = Concrete+(Rule) ∪ Concrete−(Rule).
Two frames are in static inclusion if, and only if, the
corresponding planning system has no solution.
Proposition 1: Let φ and ψ be two frames with dom(φ) =
dom(ψ), and Θ = 〈Fact0,Fact(φ, ψ),R〉 where
R = Concrete(RuleA) ∪Rtestfail ∪R
atom
fail .
Let Π = 〈Θ, {bad}〉. We have that φ 6⊑s ψ if, and only if, Π
has a solution.
As we shall see later, in order to obtain an efficient algo-
rithm, we do not enumerate all ground attacker rules. Instead,
they are generated on the fly, only when they are needed.
V. FROM TRACE EQUIVALENCE TO PLANNING
In the previous section, we have shown how to encode
static inclusion into a planning system. We now show how
to encode trace inclusion. We consider a protocol P that is
type-compliant w.r.t. (TP , δP), and another protocol Q. For
simplicity we assume that variables of P and Q are disjoint.
Let Σ = (ΣP ∪ ΣQ) ⊎ {c0⋆, c
1
⋆, c〈ω,ω〉}. Moreover, we assume
that variables occurring in P are given with types.
A. Protocol rules
We first define the abstract rules describing the protocol be-
haviour. Given P and Q two basic processes on channel c, we
write St(P,Q) = statecP,Q(idP , idQ) where idP (resp. idQ) is
the identity substitution of domain fv(P ) (resp. fv (Q)). Then,
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the transformation Rule(P ;Q) from processes to abstract
planning rules is defined as follows: We distinguish several
cases depending on the shape of P .
1) Case P = 0:
Rule(P ;Q) = ∅.
2) Case P = out(c, u).P ′:
Rule(P ;Q) = Rule(P ′;Q′) ∪
{St(P,Q) −→ att(u, v), St(P ′, Q′); St(P,Q)}
when Q = out(c, v).Q′
Rule(P ;Q) = {St(P,Q) −→ att(u, c⋆0), bad}
otherwise.
3) Case P = in(c, u).P ′:
Rule(P ;Q) = Rule(P ′;Q′) ∪
{St(P,Q), att(u, v) −→ St(P ′, Q′); St(P,Q)}
when Q = in(c, v).Q′
Rule(P ;Q) = {St(P,Q), att(u, x) −→ bad}
otherwise (with x fresh).
Intuitively, abstract rules simply try to mimic each step of P
by a similar step of Q. Clearly, if Q cannot follow P , the two
processes are not in trace equivalence, which is modelled here
by the bad state. It then remains to check whether the bad
state is indeed reachable. Note that, in case P = out(c, u).P ′
whereas Q is not ready to perform an output, bad will be
trigger only if the outputted term is indeed a message.
Example 12: We consider protocols P ′1DS and P
′2
DS as given
in Example 7. We focus on the computations of the abstract
protocol rules for the basic process defined on channel c1, i.e.
Rule(P 1A.out(c1, enc(m1, x
1
AB)), P
2
A.out(c1, enc(m2, x
2
AB)))
where P iA = out(c1, 〈a, b〉).
in(c1, enc(〈b, xiAB , x
i
B〉, kas)).
out(c1, x
i
B).
out(c1, enc(mi, x
i
AB)) with i ∈ {1, 2}.
We have simply renamed bound variables to ensure disjoint-
ness between the variables of P 1A and those of P
2
A. Moreover,
for sake of conciseness, below, we write statec1i instead of
statec1
P 1
i
,P 2
i
where P 1i (resp P
2
i ) with i ∈ {1, 4} represents the
subprocess of P 1A (resp. P
2
A) starting at the i
th action. We write
idX the identity substitution with dom(idX) = X . Since this
basic process is made up of 4 actions, we obtain 4 abstract
protocol rules, among which the following abstract rule r3:
statec13 (id{x1
AB
,x1
B
}, id{x2
B
}) −→
att(x1B , x
2
B), state
c1
4 (id{x1AB}, ∅);
statec13 (id{x1
AB
,x1
B
}, id{x2
B
})
Since both basic processes have the same shape, no absract
rule with bad in conclusion have been computed at this stage.
This transformation is then extended to protocols in a natu-
ral way. Assume w.l.o.g. that both simple processes are made
of n basic processes (we can complete with null processes if
needed). That is, P = {P1, . . . , Pn} and Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn}.
In addition, assume w.l.o.g. that Pi and Qi are basic processes
on channel ci. We define
Rule(P ,Q) = Rule(P1, Q1) ∪ . . . ∪ Rule(Pn, Qn).
Given a substitution σ, and statecP,Q(σP , σQ) occurring in
a protocol abstract rule, the application of σ to the abstract
state is defined as follows:
statecP,Q(σP , σQ)σ = state
c
P,Q(σ ◦ σP , σ ◦ σQ).
B. Flattening
In terms of efficiency, one key step of our algorithm is
to avoid composition rules from the attacker. For this, we
transform protocol rules in order to pre-compute all necessary
composition steps. For example, consider the second step of
the Denning Sacco protocol, presented in Example 4. The
agent A expects a message m of the form {b, xAB, xB}kas
and answers with xB . Either the attacker obtains m as an
existing ciphertext or he builds the ciphertext himself, provided
he knows the key kas. In the later case, we may avoid a
composition step by considering the following (informal) rule:
b, xAB, xB , kas → xB
This rule is clearly useless for this particular example but
illustrates our flattening technique. Note that such rules will
become useful for the analysis of a more complex scenario,
in particular those involving dishonest participants.
We now explain how formally to compute the set of
flattened rules from a given abstract rule r. For this, we start
by explaining how to decompose a fact att(u, v).
Definition 9: Given a term u ∈ T (Σc,Σ∪N ∪X ), we say
that u is decomposable when:
• either u ∈ X and δP(u) is not an atomic type;
• or u 6∈ Σ ∪ N ∪ X .
Intuitively, a variable of non atomic type is decomposable
since it may be instantiated by a non atomic term which, in
turns, may have been obtained by composition. Given att(u, v)
with u decomposable, we define split(att(u, v)) as follows:
split(att(u, v)) = (f; {att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2)};σP ;σQ)
where
• δP(u) = f(τ1, τ2) for some τ1, τ2 and some f ∈ Σc;
• x1 (resp. x2) is a fresh variable of type τ1 (resp. τ2) and
σP = mgu(u, f(x1, x2));
• y1, y2 are fresh variables, σQ = mgu(v, f(y1, y2)).
Note that σP exists and is necessarily a well-typed substitu-
tion. By convention, we assume that mgu(u, u′) = ⊥ when u
and u′ are not unifiable.
Let r be an abstract rule of the form Pre −→ Add ;Del
with f = att(u, v) ∈ Pre such that u is decomposable and
split(f) = (f, S, σP , σQ). The decomposition of r w.r.t. f ,
denoted decompo(r, f), is defined as follows:
1)
(
(Pre r f) ∪ S −→ bad
)
σP in case σQ = ⊥;
2)
(
(Pre r f) ∪ S −→ Add ;Del
)
(σP ⊎ σQ) otherwise.
Then, decomposition is applied recursively on each rule.
Flat(r) = Flat({decompo(r, f) | f = att(u, v) ∈ Pre(r)
with u decomposable}) ∪ {r}
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Example 13: Considering the abstract protocol rule r3 given
in Example 12, the set Flat(r3) contains (among others):
statec12 (∅, ∅),
att(〈b, x1AB , x
1
B〉, 〈b, x
2
AB , x
2
B〉), att(kas, kas)
−→ statec13 (id{x1
AB
,x1
B
}, id{x2
B
}); state
c1
2 (∅, ∅)
statec12 (∅, ∅),
att(b, b), att(x1AB , x
2
AB), att(x
1
B , x
2
B), att(kas, kas)
−→ statec13 (id{x1
AB
,x1
B
}, id{x2
B
}); state
c1
2 (∅, ∅)
statec12 (∅, ∅), att(b, b), att(x
1
AB , x
2
AB), att(kas, kas)
att(x1B1, x
2
B1), att(x
1
B2, x
2
B2)
−→ statec13 (σ1, σ2); state
c1
2 (∅, ∅)
where
• σ1 = {x1AB 7→ x
1
AB , x
1
B 7→ enc(x
1
B1, x
1
B2)};
• σ2 = {x2B 7→ enc(x
2
B1, x
2
B2)}; and
• x1B1 (resp. x
2
B2) is of type 〈τk, τa〉 (resp. τks).
C. Concretization
Given an abstract rule r, we denote vars left(r) the variables
occurring on the left (first parameter) of a predicate occuring
in r, and similarly for vars right(r). More precisely,
• vars left(att(u, v)) = vars(u); and
• vars left(state
c
P,Q(σP , σQ)) = vars(img(σP )).
We have that vars(r) = vars left(r) ⊎ vars right(r).
Given an abstract protocol rule r, its positive concretization
simply consists in all its instantiations that are well-typed w.r.t.
the left side of the rule.
Concrete+(r) = {rσ | σ a substitution grounding for r
such that rσ only involve messages in MΣ
and δP(xσ)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r)}
Let KP = (P ; σP ; φ) and KQ = (Q; σQ; ψ) be two
configurations with dom(φ) = dom(ψ). The set of facts
associated to KP and KQ is defined as follows:
Fact(KP ,KQ) = Fact(φ, ψ) ∪
{statecP,Q(σP , σQ) | P ∈ P , Q ∈ Q are basic processes
on channel c, σP = σP |fv(P ) and σQ = σQ|fv(Q) }
We denote by Fact(KP ,KQ) ↑ S
′ when the set of facts S′
can be obtained from the set of facts Fact(KP ,KQ) by adding
only deducible facts (using destructor recipes only).
Definition 10: Given two sets of facts S and S′ such
that S = Fact(KP ,KQ) with KP = (P ;φ;σP ) and
KQ = (Q;ψ;σQ) with dom(φ) = dom(ψ), we write
Fact(KP ,KQ) ↑ S′ when:
• Fact(KP ,KQ) and S
′ coincide on states;
• for any att(u, v) ∈ Fact(KP ,KQ), att(u, v) ∈ S′; and
• for any att(u, v) ∈ S′, there exists a destructor-only
recipe R such that Rφ↓ = u, and Rψ↓ = v.
The solutions of the planning system obtained as the positive
concretization of the abstract rules of P and Q exactly
corresponds to the set of (quasi-well-typed) traces of P that
can be mimicked by Q.
Lemma 2: Let P be a protocol type-compliant
w.r.t. (TP , δP), and Q be another protocol. Let Θ be the
following planning system:
〈Fact0,Fact(P ,Q),R〉
where R = Concrete+(RuleA ∪ Flat(Rule(P ,Q))).
Let (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(P ) for some φ and such that:
• tr only contains simple recipes;
• (tr, φ) is well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP);
• (tr, ψ) ∈ traceΣ(Q) for some ψ.
Then, there exist a planning path r1, . . . , rn of
some length n from Fact(P ,Q) to some Sn such that
Fact(K ′P ,K
′
Q) ↑ Sn where K
′
P (resp. K
′
Q) is the resulting
configuration starting from P (resp. Q) and executing tr.
Conversely, let r1, . . . , rn be a planning path from
Fact(P ,Q) to Sn such that bad 6∈ Sn. Then, there exist a
trace tr, and frames φ and ψ such that:
• tr only contains simple recipes;
• (tr, φ) is well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP);
• (tr, ψ) ∈ traceΣ(Q) for some ψ; and
• Fact(K ′P ,K
′
Q) ↑ Sn where K
′
P (resp. K
′
Q) is the
resulting configuration starting from P (resp. Q) and
executing tr.
D. Case of failures
Similarly to the static case, we need to make sure that we
can detect when P and Q are not in trace inclusion. For this,
we consider additional rules that express when a step that can
be performed on the left hand side cannot be mimicked on the
right hand side.
Given an abstract protocol rule r = Pre −→ Add ;Del ,
Concrete−(r) is the set of planning rules that contains:
f1, . . . , fk −→ bad
for any sequence of facts f1, . . . , fk ∈ Fact0 such that
f1, . . . , fk left-unify with Pre with substitution σL and u ∈
MΣ for any att(u, v) ∈ AddσL, and such that one of the
following conditions holds:
• f1, . . . , fk does not right-unify with Pre;
• f1, . . . , fk right-unify with Pre with substitution σR but
v 6∈ MΣ for some att(u, v) ∈ AddσR.
Our main technical result states that our encoding in plan-
ning system is sound and complete: two protocols are in
trace inclusion if, and only if, the corresponding planning
system (obtained by considering both positive and negative
concretizations) has a solution.
Theorem 3: Let P a protocol type-compliant w.r.t. (TP , δP),
and Q be another protocol. We consider the following set R
of concrete rules:
R = Concrete(RuleA ∪ flat(Rule(P ,Q))) ∪R
test
fail ∪R
atom
fail
Let Θ = 〈Fact0,Fact(P ,Q),R〉 and Π = 〈Θ, {bad}〉. We
have that P 6⊑ Q if, and only if, Π has a solution.
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This reduction to a planning system is a key ingredient of
our result. But of course, it does not immediately yields an
algorithm since the planning system encoding trace inclusion
of a process P w.r.t. a process Q is actually infinite. Indeed,
consider for example the positive concretizations of an abstract
rule in Rule(P ;Q). There are finitely many instantiations for
the “left” part, that corresponds to Q thanks to the typing
system. However, the “right” part (corresponding to Q) may be
instantiated arbitrarily. We explain how to design an (efficient)
algorithm in the next section.
VI. ALGORITHM
Our algorithm takes as input a protocol P that is type-
compliant w.r.t. a typing system (TP , δP) and another pro-
tocol Q. We explain here how to check trace inclusion of P
in protocol Q. Then, trace equivalence is obtained by checking
trace inclusion of P in Q and Q in P .
Step 1: Compute the abstract rules of (P ;Q). As ex-
plained in Section V-A, we compute the abstract rules
Rule(P ;Q) associated to (P ;Q), and then their flattened ver-
sion flat(Rule(P ;Q)), as described in Section V-B. Together
with the attacker rules (defined in Section IV-B), this yields
RuleA ∪ flat(Rule(P ;Q)).
Step 2: Initial state. Thanks to Theorem 2, it is sufficient
to consider at most three extra constants in addition to the
constants of P and Q, that is, it is sufficient to consider Σ =
ΣP ∪ ΣQ ⊎ {c0⋆, c
1
⋆, c〈ω,ω〉}. We then add the initial states of
the protocols. More formally, we start with the initial state
Fact(P ,Q).
Step 3: Planning graph algorithm. Given a planning system,
the standard technique for finding a solution to the planning
system is to apply the planning graph algorithm (see [14]),
that we briefly recall here. The algorithm consists in building a
graph (called planning graph), that consists in an alternance of
facts layers and rules layers, linked with four kinds of edges:
Pre , Add and Del edges, that are edges between the fact
layers and the rule layers; and mutex (as in mutual exclusion)
are edges between vertices of the same layers. Mutex edges
indicate when vertices may not be obtained simultaneously.
More precisely, the planning graph algorithm proceeds as
follows. Let i denote the number of layers. Initially, i := 0.
1) The first fact layer is Nf0 = Fact(P ,Q) (the set of initial
facts) and the first rule layer is empty, N r0 = ∅.
2) From the fact layer Nfi , compute the set R of all
concrete rules (either from Concrete+ or Concrete−)
that are applicable from Nfi without any mutex edge
between facts of their precondition. Since there are a
finite number of abstract protocol rules and since the
facts in Nfi are ground and finite, the set R of concrete
rules applicable from Nfi is finite as well.
3) Compute the new mutex edges between the rules. Rules
are in mutex if they either interfere (one deletes a
precondition or an add-effect of the other) or have
competing needs (there is a mutex edge between their
preconditions).
4) Build Nfi+1 from N
r
i by adding the facts introduced by
the rules in N ri . We have that:
Nfi+1 = ∪ρ∈Nri
5) We compute the mutex edges between facts. There is
a mutex edge between two facts f, f ′ if each rule that
adds f is in mutex with each rule that adds f ′.
6) i := i+ 1
7) Check whether Nfi := N
f
i−1 (same facts and same
mutex). If yes, then stop. Otherwise, go back to Point 2.
When the planning graph algorithm stops, we obtain a
graph, that represents an over-approximation of the states
reachable from the planning system, starting from the initial
state. While we are looking for a solution to an infinite
planning system (finitely described through abstract rules), we
only need to consider a finite number of concrete rules at each
round of the algorithm (Point 2 of the algorithm). Note that
this construction is not a naive saturation that would explore
all possible paths. The mutex edges ensure a not too coarse
over-approximation and provide a mean for considering the
application of a rule to a family of facts instead a single fact.
Step 4: SAT encoding. If bad does not occur in the resulting
planning graph, then trace inclusion is guaranteed since the
planning graph is an over-approximation of the reachable
states. If bad does occur in the planning graph, we can check
whether bad is indeed reachable through SAT solvers. More
precisely, we encode the existence of a solution to the planning
system into a SAT instance, using the same technique as
SATMC (see [16]), and relying on the SAT solver minisat [28].
If bad is reachable, the SAT solver provides us with a solution,
which is translated back to an attack trace. If bad is not
reachable (that is, the SAT solver guarantees that there is no
solution), then trace inclusion is guaranteed.
Conclusion. Thanks to Theorem 3, P 6⊑t Q if, and only if, the
corresponding planning system R has a solution, that is, bad
is reachable. Therefore our algorithm is correct and complete:
it provides an attack if, and only if, P 6⊑t Q. Since P ≈t Q
is defined as P ⊑t Q and Q ⊑t P , we can then easily check
whether two processes are in trace equivalence (P ≈t Q ).
Termination. Our procedure is not guaranteed to terminate.
This may be surprising since Theorem 1 ensures that it is
sufficient to consider traces that are well-types w.r.t. (TP , δP).
Then, since the processes are deterministic, a given trace of P
can only be followed by at most one trace in Q, hence a
finite number of traces need to be considered. However, the
planning graph step over-approximates the set of facts that
need to be considered. Therefore, it may consider several
facts of the form att(u, u1), att(u, u2), . . . , att(u, un) with
distinct, uncontrolled, ui. One way to enforce termination
would be to check at each step that the planning graph
only considers reachable facts (applying our SAT encoding).
However, this would considerably slow down our algorithm
while our experiments show that, not only our algorithm
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terminates in practice, but it is also much more efficient than
other existing tools.
VII. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we analyse several protocols of the literature
and compare the results obtained using different tools that
decide equivalence for a bounded number of sessions. The
characteristics of these tools are given in Section VII-A, the
different scenarios including some scenarios with corruption
are described in Section VII-B. The result are described In
Section VII-C and a discussion is provided in Section VII-D.
Our tool as well as the source files to reproduce the bench-
marks are available at [20].
A. Tools
Spec [9], [29] deals with a fixed set of cryptographic primi-
tives, namely symmetric encryption and pairs, and protocols
with no else branch. The procedure is sound and complete
w.r.t. open bisimulation (a notion that is strictly stronger than
trace equivalence [30]) and its termination is proved [9].
Apte decides trace equivalence [8], [11], [31] for a fixed
but richer set of cryptographic primitives (i.e. symmet-
ric/asymmetric encryptions, signature, pair, and hash func-
tions). Processes are also more general: they include private
channels, internal communications, processes that are not
necessarily simple, and possibly with else branches.
Systems we are interested in are highly concurrent and
a naive exploration of all possible interleavings limits the
practical impact of those tools. Recent works [12], [13] have
partially addressed the state space explosion problem due to
naive exploration of all possible interleavings implemented
in this tool. These dedicated partial order reduction (POR)
techniques have been implemented in Apte-por (as an option
of the Apte tool) yielding a significant speed-up.
Akiss implements the procedure described in [10], [32] and
deals with rich user-defined term algebras including symmetric
encryption and pairs. It is able to check an over-approximation
of trace equivalence that actually coincides with trace equiv-
alence for the class of simple processes that we study in this
paper. Its termination has been established for the particular set
of primitives used in this paper [33], and the perfomance of the
tool has been recently improved relying on POR techniques
mentionned above.
Of course, not all the tools consider exactly the same se-
mantics. For example, Akiss considers a true equational theory
while Spec, Akiss, and SAT-equiv consider a rewrite system
(with again subtle differences). We believe nevertheless that
they prove very similar properties and we therefore compare
here their performance.
B. Scenarios with corruption
The scenario we considered so far for the Denning-Sacco
protocol is quite simple. We only consider two sessions involv-
ing honest agents. This scenario involves 6 roles in parallel,
and is denoted DS-6 in the table given in Section VII-C.
In the same spirit, we consider a simpler scenario, denoted
DS-3, that corresponds to only one instance of each role
(between honest agents). Such scenarios are known to be too
simplistic and some attacks may be missed.
To go furhter, we consider scenario where honest agents are
willing to engage communications with a dishonest agent c.
Let us develop this corruption scenario on the Denning-Sacco
protocol. Formally, we consider in addition of the three basic
processes used to model scenario DS-3, a basic process to
model that the agent a may be involved in another session
with a corrupted agent c, and the server S is ready to answer
a request coming from them. Similary, we consider also two
additional basic processes to model the fact that agent b may
be involved in another session where the role A is played by
the corrupted agent c. This scenario is therefore made up of 7
basic processes and is named accordingly DS-7.
To be more complete, we can also consider the cases where
the role of A is played by b, and the role of B is played by a
(scenario DS-10), and then we add again processes to model
sessions with a corrupted agent (scenario DS-12 and DS-14).
We consider the case where the property is encoded on
role B (strong secrecy of the key as received by B). We may
also decide to encode the property on the two instances of the
roles of B (scenario DS-6-bis) or only once (scenario DS-6).
C. Review of symmetric key protocols
Most of the protocols we considered from [23] actually fall
in our class. We sometimes need to include some explicit tags
to ensure type-compliance (this check is performed automat-
ically by our tool). We now report on experimental results.
We ran the different tools on a single Intel 3.1 GHz Xeon
core with 190Go of RAM (shared with the other 19 cores)
and we compare their performances on several protocols. For
SAT-Equiv, we further indicate the number of ground facts and
rules considered when computing the planning graph.
We decide to stop each experiment after 24h, and we
indicate by TO (Time Out) when the tool does not return
an answer within this timeframe, SO when we encounter a
stack overflow, and MO in case the tool used more than 64
Go of Memory. We encountered some bugs that are indicated
by BUG when interacting with Apte (internal errors or wrong
results). We have reported these bugs to the authors.
Some protocols are subject to replay attacks, detected by the
scenario 6-bis mentioned earlier. Even if scenarios that corre-
spond to an attack are less interesting regarding performances
comparison (since most of the tools stop their exploration
once an attack has been found), we report the corresponding
analysis in the last raw of each table, whenever applicable,
that is, whenever there is indeed an attack.
Denning Sacco. The Denning Sacco protocol has been de-
scribed in Example 4. There is a replay attack on DS-6-bis
due to a lack of freshness on the messages that are exchanged.
This attack is similar to the one explained in Example 7.
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DS Spec Akiss Apte Apte-por Sat-Eq
3 12s 0.10s 0.3s 0.03s 0.25s 58
6 MO 15s TO 8s 1s 104
7 101s 13s 2s 132
10 SO 39m 4s 166
12 TO 7s 203
14 10s 234
6-bis 78m 49s 19s 0.07s 2s 122
Wide Mouth Frog. We consider the protocol as described
in [23] but without timestamps as described below:
A→ S : A, {B,Kab}Kas
S → B : {A,Kab}Kbs
Therefore, there is a replay attack on WMF-6-bis due to a lack
of freshness on the messages that are exchanged.
WMF Spec Akiss Apte Apte-por Sat-Eq
3 6s 0.04s 0.06s 0.01s 0.10s 52
6 58m 1.6s 55m 1.5s 1s 96
7 TO 5.3s TO 2s 2s 121
10 8m30s 22m 7s 165
12 SO TO 40s 238
14 118s 312
6-bis 13m 5.7s 0.06s 0.06s 1s 114
Needham-Schroeder. We consider the Needham-Schroeder
protocol based on symmetric encryption as described in [23]
(see below).
A→ S : A,B,Na
S → A : {B,Na,Kab, {A,Kab}Kbs}Kas
A→ B : {A,Kab}Kbs
B → A : {Req,Nb}Kab
A→ B : {Rep,Nb}Kab
NS Spec Akiss Apte Apte-por Sat-Eq
3 63s 4.4s 0.4s 0.03s 2s 100
6 MO TO TO 11m 54s 245
7 TO 153s 342
10 8m 475
12 22m 622
14 77m 838
Yahalom-Lowe. We consider the protocol as described in [23].
However, to ensure type-compliance, we consider a tagged
version of the protocol.
A→ B : A,Na
B → S : {1, A,Na, Nb}Kbs
S → A : {2, B,Kab, Na, Nb}Kas
S → B : {3, A,Kab}Kbs
A→ B : {4, A,B, S,Nb}Kab
YL Spec Akiss Apte Apte-por Sat-Eq
3 11s 3s 12s 0.12s 5s 122
6 MO TO TO 35m 3m 333
7 BUG 19m 549
10 206m 934
12 19h 1391
14 TO
Yahalom-Paulson. We consider the protocol as described
in [23]. To ensure type-compliance, we consider a tagged
version of the protocol.
A→ B : A,Na
B → S : B,Nb, {1, A,Na}Kbs
S → A : Nb, {2, B,Kab, Na}Kas , {3, A,B,Kab, Nb}Kbs
A→ B : {3, A,B,Kab, Nb}Kbs , {4, Nb}Kab
YP Spec Akiss Apte Apte-por Sat-Eq
3 23m 7s 111s 0.9s 50s 234
6 MO TO TO BUG 165m 976
7 TO
Otway-Rees. We have also analysed a tagged version of the
Otway-Rees protocol (see [23]).
A→ B : M,A,B, {1, Na,M,A,B}Kas
B → S : M,A,B, {1, Na,M,A,B}Kas,
{2, Nb,M,A,B}Kbs
S → B : M, {3, Na,Kab}Kas, {4, Nb,Kab}Kbs
B → A : M, {3, Na,Kab}Kas
OR Spec Akiss Apte Apte-por Sat-Eq
3 16m 225s BUG 24s 104s 239
6 MO SO SO 46m 660
7 50m 637
10 276m 1033
12 9h40m 1265
14 TO
Simple stateful example. Some protocols are stateful (see [34]
for a detailed discussion). For example, a process may lock
a ressource which cannot be used until it is unlocked. We
consider here a mock protocol that reflects this type of
behaviors. The protocol Pyes(n) with n tokens is described
informally below (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and is made of 3n processes
running in parallel on distinct channels.
1. → {tokai}ki , {tokbi}ki
2. {x}ki → x
3. tokai, tokbi → yes
Here, yes and no are public constants, whereas ki, tokai, and
tokbi are names unknown by the attacker. The protocol Pno(n)
can be defined similarly. Intuitively, Pyes(n) ≈ Pno(n) holds
since rule 2 can be used only once for each key ki. Therefore,
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it is never possible to trigger a rule of type 3. We checked
equivalence using ProVerif and, unsurprinsgly, it found a false
attack. This is due to the fact that ProVerif cannot properly
model “a finite amount of time”.
# tok. Spec Akiss Apte Apte-por Sat-Eq
1 15s 0.02s 0.09s 0.01s 0.16s 49
2 MO 0.37s 240m 0.15s 1s 100
3 18s MO 5s 2s 144
4 SO 9min32s 6s 188
12 TO 155s 540
36 85m 1596
60 6h40m 2652
D. Discussion
For ease of comparison, we decided to run our experiments
using a single core machine since not all the tools are able
to take advantage of more cores. Running these examples
using more cores would have benefited to our tool that reaches
its optimum when it is launched using 4 cores (2 inclusions
have to be checked with constants c0⋆ and c
1
⋆ (resp. c〈ω,ω〉)),
and also to Akiss on which the saturation process is highly
parallelizable.
The obtained results give evidence that our technique is less
sensitive to the number of concurrent sessions analysed. On
the contrary, the other tools that handle messages symbolically
are less sensitive to the size of messages, which explains why
our tool is typically slower on a small number of sessions.
Moreover, on all our secure examples on which no attack
is found, the planning graph is an over-approximation that
appears to be precise enough, and does not require calls to
the SAT solver. For the examples where an attack has been
found (DS-6-bis and WMF-6-bis), the resulting SAT formulas
contain about 750 variables and 4000 clauses.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our tool SAT-Equiv outperforms all existing tools, even for
the new Apte-por variant of Apte and the recently updated
Akiss tool on which POR techniques have also been integrated.
We also discovered several bugs in Apte-por, which prevented
us from a thorough comparison of the two tools. SAT-Equiv
is sometimes slower for a small number of sessions but in all
cases, SAT-Equiv is the tool that allows to analyze the largest
number of sessions.
One limitation of our tool is the fact that it covers protocols
with symmetric encryption only. This is not an intrinsic
limitation of our approach but rather a current limitation of the
typing result [19], which states that we can limit ourselves to
well-type attack traces. We plan to extend [19] to all standard
primitives and we believe that the extension to SAT-Equiv to
all standard primitives would then follow quite easily.
Note also that our tool is not guaranteed to terminate. We
could enforce termination by checking reachability of the
considered facts while building the planning graph, at the
price of considerably slowing down our tool. Instead, as future
work, we plan to formally prove termination of the planning
graph construction or to identify under which assumptions,
termination can be guaranteed.
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APPENDIX A
REDUCTION RESULTS
A. Bounding the size of messages
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 1. A similar
result is stated and proved in [19] but for a slighlty different
semantics regarding rewriting of terms. Here, whenever an
inner decryption/projection fails then the overall evaluation
fails. Intuitively, we model eager evaluation while [19] models
lazy evaluation. More formally, in [19], a term u can be
rewritten in v if there is a position p in u, and a rewriting
rule ℓ → r and a substitution σ such that u|p = ℓσ, and
v = u[rσ]p, i.e v in which the subterm at position p has been
replaced by rσ. We will denote u⇒ v this notion of rewriting,
and u⇓ the associated notion of normal form of u.
Example 14: Let u = dec(enc(c, proj1(a)), proj1(a)). We
have that u⇒ c whereas u can not be reduced w.r.t. → since
proj1(a) is not a message.
Definition 11: A recipe R is without detour if it does
not contain any subterm of the form dec(enc(R1, R2), R3),
proj1(〈R1, R2〉), and proj2(〈R1, R2〉) for any recipes
R1, R2, R3.
Lemma 3: Let φ be a frame, and R be a recipe without
detour. If Rφ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 then we have that Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 .
Moreover, we have that R is actually a recipe made of
constructors on top of destructors.
Proof. We first show by structural induction on R the
following claim.
Claim. Let φ be a frame,R be a recipe without detour such that
root(R) 6∈ Σc, and root(Rφ⇓) 6∈ Σd. We have that Rφ⇓ =
Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 and R is destructor-only.
Base case: R = w for some w ∈ dom(φ). In such a case, the
result trivially holds.
Inductive case: R = dec(R1, R2) (or R = proji(R
′) with
i ∈ {1, 2}). First, we know that root(R1) 6= enc since R
is without detour, and we have also that root(R1) 6= 〈 〉
since root(dec(R1, R2)φ⇓) 6∈ Σd. Therefore, we have that
root(R1) 6∈ Σc. We have that Rφ⇓ = dec(R1, R2)φ⇓ =
dec(R1φ⇓, R2φ⇓)⇓. Since root(Rφ⇓) 6∈ Σd, we deduce that
root(R1φ⇓) 6∈ Σd. Therefore, we can apply our induction
hypothesis on R1, and we deduce that R1φ⇓ = R1φ↓ ∈ MΣ0 ,
and R1 is destructor-only. We know that R1φ⇓ = R1φ↓ =
enc(u1, u2) and R2φ⇓ = u2 for some terms u1, u2. Since
enc(u1, u2) ∈ MΣ0 , we have that u2 ∈ MΣ0 , and since
it occurs in key position, it is an atom. Therefore, we have
that root(R2) 6∈ Σc, and root(R2φ⇓) 6∈ Σd. Thus, we can
apply our induction hypothesis, and we obtain that R2φ⇓ =
R2φ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R2 is destructor-only. This allows us
to conclude that R = dec(R1, R2) is destructor-only and
Rφ⇓ = Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 .
The case where R = proji(R
′) with i ∈ {1, 2} can be done
in a similar way. This concludes the proof of the claim.
Now, we prove the result stated in the lemma. Let R
be a recipe without detour. Let C be a context built using
constructor symbols and R1, . . . , Rk be recipes such that
root(Ri) 6∈ Σc (i ∈ {1, . . . , k}), and R = C[R1, . . . , Rk].
Note that C can be the empty context in case root(R) 6∈ Σc,
and in such a case we conclude thanks to the previous claim.
Otherwise, we have that Rφ⇓ = C[R1φ⇓, . . . , Rkφ⇓], and
therefore Riφ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and R1, . . . , Rk
are recipes without detour. We apply our claim and we obtain
that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Riφ⇓ = Riφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 and Ri is
destructor-only. This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 4: Let φ be a frame, and R be a recipe without
detour. If Rφ⇓ 6∈ MΣ0 then there exists f ∈ Σc ∪ Σd such
that:
• R = f(R1, . . . , Rk) for some R1, . . . , Rk;
• Rφ⇓ = f(u1, . . . , uk) for some u1, . . . , uk; and
• R1φ⇓ = u1, . . . , Rkφ⇓ = uk.
Proof. We show this result by induction on R.
Base case: R = w. In such a case, Rφ⇓ = Rφ ∈ MΣ0 , and
we are done.
Inductive step. Consider the case where R = enc(R1, R2). In
such a case, we have that Rφ⇓ = enc(R1φ⇓, R2φ⇓), and we
are done. The case where R = 〈R1, R2〉 can be done in a
similar way. Now, consider the case where R = dec(R1, R2).
In such a case, we have that Rφ⇓ = dec(R1φ⇓, R2φ⇓)⇓.
In case the dec symbol at the root position does not reduce,
we are done. Otherwise, we have that R1φ⇓ = enc(u1, u2),
and R2φ⇓ = u2 for some u1, u2. Moreover, we know that
u1 6∈ MΣ0 , and thus R1φ⇓ 6∈ MΣ0 , and thanks to our
induction hypothesis, we have that root(R1) = enc, and this
contradicts the fact that R is without detour. The case where
R = proji(R1) can be done in a similar way. 
Lemma 5: Let R be a recipe. There exists a recipe R′
without detour such that R′φ⇓ = Rφ⇓ for any frame φ such
that Rφ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 .
Proof. We introduce special notation to describe terms in
this proof. For any terms t, t′ and position p of the term t, t|p
is the subterm of t at position p, and t[t′]p denotes the term
t in which the term occurring at position p has been replaced
by t′. Given a term t and a position p of t, we denote seqp(t)
the sequence of function symbols encountered along the path
from ǫ (the root of t) to p.
Let R be a recipe. We consider a derivation in prefix order
from R to its normal form w.r.t. the following linear rewriting
system. Note that the last rule is not the usual one.
proj1(〈x, y〉) → x, proj2(〈x, y〉) → y, dec(enc(x, y), z) → x
We will denote the associated normal form by ↓ℓ.
We have that:
R = R0 →p1 R1 →p2 . . .→pn Rn = R
′
Assume by contradiction that there exists a first index i such
that Riφ⇓ 6= Ri+1φ⇓. So the reduction at position pi+1 is not
possible in Riφ. Therefore [Riφ]pi+1 = dec(enc(t1, t2), t3) for
some t1, t2, t3, as projections pass in Riφ whenever they pass
in Ri. As Riφ⇓ 6= Ri+1φ⇓, t2⇓ 6= t3⇓. So dec(enc(t1, t2), t3)
15
will never reduce. We show that it will never be deleted by a
reduction occuring above.
More precisely, we show by induction on n the following
property. For every n, if Riφ →n t (for the lazy evaluation,
i.e. the one w.r.t. ⇓ semantics), then
1) pi+1 is a path of t, t|pi+1⇓ = dec(enc(t1, t2), t3)⇓ and
seqpi+1(t) = seqpi+1(Ri);
2) for any p ≤lex pi+1 such that p is a path of t, if t|p is
headed with a constructor symbol then
• either p is a path of Ri and seqp(t) = seqp(Ri),
• or t|p is a subterm of a term of img(φ).
The case n = 0 is straightforward. Consider now a term
t′ such that Riφ →n t → t′. By induction hypothesis, the
properties above hold for t. We consider the position p′ at
which the reduction occurs in t.
• If p′ ≥lex pi+1 and pi+1 is not a prefix of p′, then the
induction hypothesis is trivially preserved.
• If pi+1 is a prefix of p
′, then clearly, t′|pi+1⇓ = t|pi+1⇓ =
dec(enc(t1, t2), t3)⇓ and the positions p′′ <lex pi+1 are
left unchanged.
• If p′ <lex pi+1, we consider two cases. We have t
′ =
t[rθ]p′ and t|p′ = lθ for some θ and l → r is one of the
rewrite rules.
1) either p′ is not a prefix of pi+1, then property
(1) is easily preserved for t′. Assume that l =
dec(enc(x, y), y). Since p′ <lex pi+1, we must have
p′.1 ≤lex pi+1 (we may even note that p′ ≤lex pi+1
since p′ is not a prefix of pi+1). Since t|p′.1 is
headed by enc, we have by induction hypothesis
that
– either t|p′.1 = enc(t′1, t
′
2) is a subterm of a term
of img(φ) and thus t′ = t[t′1]p′ satisfies property
(2).
– or p′.1 is a path of Ri and seqp′.1(t) =
seqp′.1(Ri), which means that Ri could have
been reduced at position p′, contradiction. (Re-
member that these reductions have been per-
formed following the prefix order.)
The case of the projection rule is similar.
2) or p′ is a prefix of pi+1. If p
′.1 is also a prefix of
pi+1, then Ri could have been reduced at position p
′
(as seqpi+1(t) = seqpi+1(Ri)), contradiction. Thus
we must have that l = dec(enc(x, y), y) and p′.2
prefix of pi+1. Since p
′.1 ≤lex p′.2 ≤lex pi+1 and
t|p′.1 = enc(t′1, t
′
2), by induction hypothesis, we
deduce that
– either t|p′.1 = enc(t′1, t
′
2) is a subterm of a term
of img(φ). As p′.2 is a prefix of pi+1, t|pi+1
is a subterm of tp′.2. Moreover, since there is a
reduction dec(enc(x, y), y) → x at position p′,
we know that t|p′.1.2 = t′2 = t|p′.2. Therefore,
we have that t|pi+1 is a subterm of t|p′.2 = t
′
2
(a constructor term). However, t|pi+1 contains a
destructor since seqpi+1(t) = seqpi+1(Ri) (by
induction hypothesis, item 1). Hence, we obtain
a contradiction.
– or p′.1 is a path of Ri and seqp′.1(t) =
seqp′.1(Ri), which means that Ri could have
been reduced at position p′, contradiction.
Thanks to item 1, we have that [Riφ]pi+1⇓ =
dec(enc(t1⇓, t2⇓), t3⇓) is a subterm of Rφ⇓, which is not
a message. It is what we wanted to prove. 
Lemma 6: Let φ and ψ be two frames. We have that
φ ⊑s ψ if, and only if, φ is statically included in ψ w.r.t.
the semantics ⇓.
Proof. We show the two directions separately.
(⇐). Let φ and ψ be two frames such that φ ⊑s ψ w.r.t. the
semantics ⇓. We have to show that φ ⊑s ψ. We show this
result by induction on the number of steps to make the recipe
R (or the test R1 = R2) in normal form w.r.t. the rules below
(and considering an innermost derivation). Note that the last
rule is not the usual one.
proj1(〈x, y〉) → x, proj2(〈x, y〉) → y, dec(enc(x, y), z) → x
Base case: R (or R1, R2) is without detour.
• Let R be a recipe without detour such that Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 .
We have also that Rφ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 , and thanks to our
hypothesis, we know that Rψ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 . Applying
Lemma 3, we deduce that Rψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 .
• Let R1, R2 be two recipes without detour such that
R1φ↓, R2φ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R1φ↓ = R2φ↓. We have
also that R1φ⇓, R2φ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R1φ⇓ = R2φ⇓.
Since φ ⊑s ψ w.r.t. the semantics ⇓, we deduce that
R1ψ⇓, R2ψ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R1ψ⇓ = R2ψ⇓. Applying
Lemma 3, we deduce that R1ψ↓, R2ψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 and
therefore R1ψ↓ = R2ψ↓.
Inductive step.
• Let R be a recipe that contains n detours such
that Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 . We assume w.l.o.g. that R =
C[dec(enc(R1, R2), R3)], and R1, R2, R3 are without
detour. Let R′ = C[R1]. By definition of the rewrit-
ing, we have that R2φ↓, R3φ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R2φ↓ =
R3φ↓. We have also that enc(R1φ↓, R2φ↓) ∈ MΣ0 .
Since R2, R3 and enc(R1, R2) are without detour, we
know that R2ψ↓, R3ψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , R2ψ↓ = R3ψ↓, and
enc(R1, R2)ψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 . Moreover, we have that R
′φ↓ ∈
MΣ0 , and applying the induction hypothesis, we deduce
that R′ψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , therefore we deduce that
Rψ↓ = C[dec(enc(R1ψ↓, R2ψ↓), R3ψ↓)]↓
= C[R1ψ↓]↓
= R′ψ↓ ∈ MΣ0
• Let R1, R2 be two recipes that contains n1 + n2
detours and such that R1φ↓, R2φ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , and
R1φ↓ = R2φ↓. Moreover, we assume w.l.o.g. that
R1 = C[dec(enc(Ra, Rb), Rc)] and Ra, Rb, Rc are
recipes without detour. Let R′1 = C[Ra]. By definition
of the rewriting, we have that Rbφ↓, Rcφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , and
Rbφ↓ = Rcφ↓. We have also that enc(Raφ↓, Rbφ↓) ∈
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MΣ0 . Since Rb, Rc and enc(Ra, Rb) are without detour,
we know that Rbψ↓, Rcψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , Rbψ↓ = Rcψ↓,
and enc(Ra, Rb)ψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 . Moreover, we have that
R′1φ↓, R2φ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R
′
1φ↓ = R2φ↓. Applying
our induction hypothesis, we deduce that R′1ψ↓, R2ψ↓ ∈
MΣ0 , and R
′
1ψ↓ = R2ψ↓. Therefore, we deduce that
R1ψ↓, R2ψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R1ψ↓ = R2ψ↓.
This allows us to conlude that φ ⊑s ψ w.r.t. the semantics ⇓
implies that φ ⊑s ψ.
(⇒) Let φ and ψ be two frames such that φ ⊑s ψ. We have to
show that φ ⊑s ψ w.r.t. the semantics ⇓. We show this result
(or more precisely a slightly stronger result) by induction on
the number of steps to make the recipe R (or the test R1 =
R2) in normal form w.r.t. the rules below (and considering an
outermost derivation). Note that the last rule is not the usual
one.
proj1(〈x, y〉) → x, proj2(〈x, y〉) → y, dec(enc(x, y), z) → x
Actually, we transfer all the tests even those that do not reduce
to messages.
Base case: R (or R1, R2) is without detour.
• Let R be a recipe without detour such that Rφ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 .
Thanks to Lemma 3, we have that Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 . Since
φ ⊑s ψ, we deduce that Rψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , and therefore
Rψ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 .
• Let R1, R2 be two recipes without detour such that
R1φ⇓, R2φ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R1φ⇓ = R2φ⇓. Thanks
to Lemma 3, we have that R1φ↓, R2φ↓ ∈ MΣ0 ,
and R1φ↓ = R2φ↓. Since φ ⊑s ψ, we deduce that
R1ψ↓, R2ψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R1ψ↓ = R2ψ↓. Therefore,
we conclude that R1ψ⇓, R2ψ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 , and R1ψ⇓ =
R2ψ⇓.
• Let R1, R2 be two recipes without detour such that
R1φ⇓ = R2φ⇓ (but R1φ↓ and R2φ↓ are not both in
MΣ0 ). We show that R1ψ⇓ = R2ψ⇓ by induction on
|R1|+ |R2|, i.e. number of symbols in R1 and R2. When
R1φ⇓, R2φ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 , we have already shown the result,
therefore we consider the case where R1φ⇓, R2φ⇓ 6∈
MΣ0 . Applying Lemma 4 on R1, R2, we deduce that
we are in one of the following cases:
1) R1 = f(R
′
1, R
′′
1 ), R2 = f(R
′
2, R
′′
2 ) for some
R′1, R
′′
1 , R
′
2, R
′′
2 , and f ∈ {enc, dec, 〈〉}. Moreover,
we have that R1φ⇓ = R2φ⇓ = f(u′, u′′) for
some u′, u′′ such that R′1φ⇓ = R
′
2φ⇓ = u
′, and
R′′1φ⇓ = R
′′
2φ⇓ = u
′′.
2) R1 = proji(R
′
1), R2 = proji(R
′
2) for some R
′
1, R
′
2.
Moreover, we have that R1φ⇓ = R2φ⇓ = proji(u
′)
for some u′ such that R′1φ⇓ = R
′
2φ⇓ = u
′.
We apply our induction hypothesis on the test R′1 = R
′
2
(and R′′1 = R
′′
2 ). This allows us to conclude that R
′
1ψ⇓ =
R′2ψ⇓ (and R
′′
1ψ⇓ = R
′′
2ψ⇓), and therefore conclude that
R1ψ⇓ = f(R′1ψ⇓, R
′′
1ψ⇓)⇓
= f(R′2ψ⇓, R
′′
2ψ⇓)⇓
= R2ψ⇓.
Inductive step.
• Let R be a recipe that contains n detours such
that Rφ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 . We assume w.l.o.g. that R =
C[dec(enc(R1, R2), R3)], and this pattern corresponds to
the outermost detour. Let R′ = C[R1]. By definition of
the rewriting, we have that R2φ⇓ = R3φ⇓ (even if we do
not know whether they are messages or not). Applying
our induction hypothesis, we know that R2ψ⇓ = R3ψ⇓,
and R′ψ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 . Therefore, we deduce that
Rψ⇓ = C[dec(enc(R1ψ⇓, R2ψ⇓), R3ψ⇓)]⇓
= C[R1ψ⇓]⇓
= R′ψ⇓ ∈ MΣ0
• Let R1, R2 be two recipes that contain n1 + n2 detours
and such that R1φ⇓ = R2φ⇓. We assume w.l.o.g. that
R = C[dec(enc(Ra, Rb), Rc)], and this pattern corre-
sponds to the outermost detour. Let R′1 = C[Ra]. By
definition of the rewriting, we have that Rbφ⇓ = Rcφ⇓
(even if we do not know whether they are messages or
not). Applying our induction hypothesis, we know that
Rbψ⇓ = Rcψ⇓. Therefore, we deduce that R1ψ⇓ =
R2ψ⇓.
This allows us to conclude that φ ⊑s ψ implies that φ ⊑s ψ
w.r.t. the semantics ⇓. 
Theorem 1: Let P be a protocol type-compliant w.r.t.
(TP , δP) and Q be another protocol. We have that P 6⊑t Q
w.r.t. Σ0 if, and only if, there exists a witness tr of this non-
inclusion that only contains simple recipes and such that one
of the following holds:
1) (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ0(P) for some φ and (tr, φ) is well-
typed w.r.t. (TP , δP);
2) tr = tr′{c0 7→ c〈ω,ω〉} for some c0 ∈ Σ0 r ΣP , and
(tr′, φ′) ∈ traceΣ0(P) for some φ
′ and (tr′, φ′) is well-
typed w.r.t. (TP , δP).
Proof. We have that P 6⊑t Q w.r.t. Σ0, and therefore there
exists a witness (tr, φ) of this non-inclusion. We have that
(tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ0(P) and:
1) either (tr, ψ) 6∈ traceΣ0(Q) for any frame ψ;
2) or (tr, ψ) ∈ traceΣ0(Q) for some ψ but φ 6⊑s ψ
w.r.t. Σ0.
Note that, due to the fact that we consider simple protocols,
the frame ψ is uniquely defined when it exists. Moreover,
we chose tr minimal in length. We first establish that P
is not included in Q w.r.t. the semantics ⇓ for terms. We
distinguish the two cases we mentionned above. Regarding
case 2, we have that (tr, φ) (resp. (tr, ψ)) is a trace of P
(resp. Q) w.r.t. the semantics ⇓, and therefore we conclude
thanks to Lemma 6. Regarding case 1, we have that (tr, φ) is
a trace of P w.r.t. the semantics ⇓, and we know also that
tr−1 (i.e. tr without the last action) is a trace of Q w.r.t.
the semantics ⇓. Let α be such that tr = tr−1 · α. Since
we know that tr = tr−1 · α is not a trace of Q (w.r.t. the
semantics ↓), the only case where tr can become a trace of Q
w.r.t. the semantics ⇓ is when α = in(c, R) with Rψ⇓ ∈ MΣ0
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whereas Rψ↓ 6∈ MΣ0 . However, we know that φ ⊑s ψ w.r.t.
semantics ↓ (thanks to the minimality of our witness), and
since we have Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , we know that Rψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 .
Therefore this case can not happen. We have shown that
P 6⊑t Q w.r.t. semantics ⇓.
Now, we can apply the typing result as stated and proved
in [19], we deduce that there exists a witness (tr, φ) of this
non-inclusion (w.r.t. the semantics ⇓) such that one of the
following holds:
1) (tr, φ) is a trace of P (w.r.t. the semantics ⇓) and (tr, φ)
is well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP); or
2) tr = tr′{c0 7→ c〈ω,ω〉} for some c0 ∈ Σ0 r ΣP , and
some (tr′, φ′) a trace of P (w.r.t. the semantics ⇓) for
some φ′, and (tr′, φ′) is well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP).
We consider among these witnesses one that is of minimal
length. We have that (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) (w.r.t. the semantics ⇓)
and:
1) either (tr, ψ) 6∈ trace(Q) (w.r.t. the semantics ⇓) for any
frame ψ;
2) or (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) (w.r.t. the semantics ⇓) for some
ψ but φ 6⊑s ψ (w.r.t. the semantics ⇓).
Regarding case 2, we apply Lemma 5 and we consider tr a
trace made of recipes without detours such that trφ⇓ = trφ⇓,
and trψ⇓ = trψ⇓. Thanks to Lemma 3, the resulting trace
is made of simple recipes. We have that φ 6⊑s ψ (w.r.t. the
semantics ↓) thanks to Lemma 6. Regarding case 1, we have to
show that tr is not a trace of Q w.r.t. the semantics ↓. We know
that tr = tr−1 · α, and in such a case α = in(c, R) whereas
its counterpart in tr is in(c, R). We know that Rφ⇓ = Rφ⇓ ∈
MΣ0 , and therefore Rψ⇓ = Rψ⇓ ∈ MΣ0 since otherwise
we would contradict the minimality of our witness. Therefore,
tr is not a trace of Q w.r.t. the semantics ⇓, and thanks to
Lemma 3, we deduce that tr is not a trace of Q w.r.t. the
semantics ↓.
Note that trφ↓ = trφ↓, and since tr satisfies the require-
ments regarding typing, we easily deduce that (tr, φ) satisfies
the requirements regarding typing. 
B. Bounding the number of constants
First, we establish the following result.
Proposition 2: Let P be a protocol type-compliant w.r.t.
(TP , δP) and Q be another protocol. Let Σ = ΣP ⊎ {c ∈
Σ0 | δ0(c) = τ⋆}. We have that P 6⊑t Q w.r.t. Σ0 if, and
only if, there exists a witness tr of this non-inclusion w.r.t.
Σ that only contains simple recipes, and such that (tr, φ) ∈
traceΣ(P) for some φ and (tr, φ) is quasi-well-typed w.r.t.
(TP , δP).
Proof. First note that the converse is obvious: if there is any
kind of witness of non-inclusion, then P 6⊑ Q w.r.t. Σ0. So
we only prove the direct part.
Assume that P 6⊑ Q w.r.t. Σ0. By Theorem 1, it implies
that there exists a witness tr of this non-inclusion that only
contains simple recipes and such that one of the following
holds:
1) (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ0(P) for some φ and (tr, φ) is well-
typed w.r.t. (TP , δP);
2) tr = tr′{c0 7→ c〈ω,ω〉} for some c0 ∈ Σ0 r ΣP , and
(tr′, φ′) ∈ traceΣ0(P) for some φ
′ and (tr′, φ′) is well-
typed w.r.t. (TP , δP).
Assume that one of those conditions holds. In each case, tr
is a trace w.r.t. Σ0 quasi-well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP), as c〈ω,ω〉
has type τ⋆ (the smallest for ). Then there is only a finite
number of public constants of Σ0 r ΣP occuring in (tr, φ).
Call them {c1, . . . , cn}. As {c ∈ Σ0 r ΣQ | δ0(c) = τ⋆} is
infinite, we choose c′1, . . . , c
′
n in this set (different from c〈ω,ω〉)
and define a substitution σ such that σ(ci) = c
′
i for each i.
As c1, . . . , cn do not occur in P , (trσ, φσ) is a trace of P
w.r.t. Σ. If (tr, φ) was not a trace of Q, then (trσ, φσ) is still
not because c′1, . . . , c
′
n do not occur in Q. If (tr, ψ) was a
trace of Q. it passes in Q with frame ψσ. As σ is a bijective
substitution, R(φσ)↓ is a message if and only if (Rσ−1)φ↓
is. So if there is a recipe R such that Rφ↓ is a message, but
Rψ↓ is not, then (Rσ)(φσ)↓ is a message, but (Rσ)(ψσ)↓ is
not.
The equality case is similar, so trσ is still a witness of non-
inclusion. 
Note that we still have an unbounded number of constants
to consider. We have to consider constants that occur in P and
in addition an unbounded number of constants of type τ⋆. In
the following, we show that it is actually sufficient to consider
two constants of type τ⋆. To prove Theorem 2, we have to state
and prove some useful properties about renamings.
Given a set of atomic data A, an A-renaming is a function ρ
such that dom(ρ) ∪ img(ρ) ⊆ A.
Lemma 7: Let Σ ⊆ Σ0, and t, t′ be two terms in
T (Σstd,Σ ∪N ).
1) If t↓ ∈ MΣ then (t↓)ρ = (tρ)↓ for any Σ-renaming ρ.
2) If t↓ 6∈ MΣ, then there exists c0 ∈ Σ such that for any
Σ-renaming ρ such that c0 6∈ dom(ρ)∪ img(ρ), we have
that tρ↓ 6∈ MΣ.
3) If t↓, t′↓ ∈ MΣ and t↓ 6= t
′↓, there exists c0 ∈ Σ such
that for any Σ-renaming ρ such that c0 6∈ dom(ρ) ∪
img(ρ), we have that tρ↓ 6= t′ρ↓.
Proof. We prove the three items separately.
Item 1. Let t ∈ T (Σstd,Σ∪N ) such that t↓ ∈ MΣ. We show
the result by structural induction on t.
Base case: t ∈ Σ ∪ N . In such a case, we have that (t↓)ρ =
tρ = (tρ)↓.
Inductive case: In such a case, t = f(t1, t2) with f ∈
{enc, dec, 〈 〉, proj1, proj2}.
• Case f = enc. In such a case, we have that t =
enc(t1, t2), and t↓ = enc(t1↓, t2↓). Therefore, we know
that t1↓, t2↓ ∈ MΣ, and we conclude relying on our
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induction hypothesis:
(t↓)ρ = enc(t1↓, t2↓)ρ
= enc((t1↓)ρ, (t2↓)ρ)
= enc((t1ρ)↓, (t2ρ)↓)
= enc(t1ρ, t2ρ)↓
= (enc(t1, t2)ρ)↓
= (tρ)↓
• Case f = dec. In such a case, we have that t =
dec(t1, t2), t1↓, t2↓ ∈ MΣ, t1↓ = enc(u, v), t2 = v
and dec(t1, t2)↓ = u for some u ∈ MΣ, and v ∈
Σ ∪ N . Thanks to our induction hypothesis, we have
that (t1↓)ρ = enc(u, v)ρ = enc(uρ, vρ) = (t1ρ)↓ and
(t2↓)ρ = vρ = (t2ρ)↓. Therefore, we have that (t↓)ρ =
(dec(t1, t2)↓)ρ = uρ, and (tρ)↓ = (dec(t1, t2)ρ)↓ =
dec(t1ρ↓, t2ρ↓)↓ = dec(enc(uρ, vρ), vρ)↓ = uρ. This
allows us to conclude.
The cases where f ∈ {〈 〉, proj1, proj2} can be done in a similar
way.
Item 2. Let t ∈ T (Σstd,Σ∪N ) such that t↓ 6∈ MΣ. We show
the result by structural induction on t.
Base case: t ∈ Σ∪N . In such a case, we have that t↓ ∈ MΣ.
Therefore, this case is impossible.
Inductive case: In such a case, t = f(t1, t2) with f ∈
{enc, dec, 〈 〉, proj1, proj2}.
• Case f = enc. We have that f(t1, t2)↓ = f(t1↓, t2↓). Since
f(t1, t2)↓ 6∈ MΣ, we have that either t1↓ 6∈ MΣ; or
t2↓ 6∈ MΣ; or t2↓ 6∈ Σ ∪ N .
In case t1↓ 6∈ MΣ (resp. t2↓ 6∈ MΣ), by induction
hypothesis, there exists c0 ∈ Σ such that t1ρ↓ 6∈ MΣ
(resp. t2ρ↓ 6∈ MΣ) for any Σ-renaming ρ such that
c0 6∈ dom(ρ) ∪ img(ρ), and this allows us to conclude.
In case t2↓ ∈ MΣ but t2↓ 6∈ Σ∪N , thanks to Item 1, we
know that t2ρ↓ = t2↓ρ for any Σ-renaming ρ. Therefore
t2ρ↓ 6∈ Σ ∪N for any Σ-renaming ρ, and enc(t1, t2)ρ 6∈
MΣ for any Σ-renaming ρ.
• Case f = 〈 〉. In such a case, we have that f(t1, t2)↓ =
f(t1↓, t2↓). Since f(t1, t2)↓ 6∈ MΣ, we have that either
t1↓ 6∈ MΣ; or t2↓ 6∈ MΣ. Therefore, we conclude by
applying our induction hypthesis.
• Case f = dec. In case t1↓ 6∈ MΣ or t2↓ 6∈ MΣ, we
conclude by applying our induction hypothesis. Now, we
assume that t1↓ ∈ MΣ and t2↓ ∈ MΣ. Since t↓ 6∈ MΣ,
we know that either t1↓ is not of the form enc(u, v), or
t1↓ is of the form enc(u, v) and t2↓ = v′ but v 6= v′.
Thanks to Item 1, we know that (t1↓)ρ = (t1ρ)↓ and
(t2↓)ρ = (t2ρ)↓ for any Σ-renaming ρ. Therefore, in the
first case, we deduce that the root symbol of t1ρ↓ is not
enc for any Σ-renaming, and we are done. In the second
case, for any Σ-renaming ρ, we have that:
(tρ)↓ = dec((t1ρ)↓, (t2ρ)↓)↓
= dec((t1↓)ρ, (t2↓)ρ)↓
= dec(t1↓, t2↓)ρ↓
= dec(enc(u, v), v′)ρ)↓
Moreover, we know that v 6= v′. In case v or v′ is not
a constant in Σ, we still have that vρ 6= v′ρ for any Σ-
renaming ρ, and therefore we are done: (tρ)↓ 6∈ MΣ. In
case, v, v′ are both in Σ, let c0 be the constant v
′, and
consider any renaming ρ such that c0 6∈ dom(ρ)∪img (ρ).
We have that vρ 6= c0, and thus vρ 6= v′ρ, and this allows
us to conclude.
• Case f = proj1 (or proj2). In such a case, we have that
t = proj1(t
′) for some t′. In case t′↓ 6∈ MΣ, we conclude
by applying our induction hypothesis. Now, assuming that
t′↓ ∈ MΣ, we know that t′↓ is not of the form 〈u, v〉
(since otherwise t↓ ∈ MΣ). Thanks to Item 1, we have
that (t′↓)ρ = (t′ρ)↓ for any Σ-renaming ρ. Therefore,
we know that (t′ρ)↓ is not of the form 〈u′, v′〉 for any
Σ-renaming ρ, and thus tρ↓ 6∈ MΣ for any Σ-renaming.
Item 3. Let t1, t2 ∈ T (Σstd,Σ ∪ N ) such that t1↓, t2↓ ∈ MΣ
and t1↓ 6= t2↓. Thanks to Item 1, we have that (t1↓)ρ = (t1ρ)↓
and (t2↓)ρ = (t2ρ)↓. Therefore, we can simply show that if
t1, t2 ∈ MΣ and t1 6= t2 then there exists c0 ∈ Σ such that
t1ρ 6= t2ρ for any Σ-renaming ρ such that c0 6∈ dom(ρ) ∪
img(ρ).
Base case: The only non trivial base case is when both t1
and t2 are in Σ. In such a case, let c0 be t2. Clearly, since
t1 6= t2, we have that t1ρ = t2ρ for any Σ-renaming ρ such
that c0 6∈ dom(ρ)∪ img(ρ). The other base cases where either
t1 or t2 is in Σ ∪ N are trivial and we may actually choose
any Σ-renaming ρ.
Inductive case: Now, in case t1 and t2 are not atomic, we dis-
tinguish two cases. In case they do not have the same function
symbol has their root, again we can actually choose any Σ-
renaming ρ, and the disequality between t1ρ and t2ρ will be
preserved. Now, assume that t1 = f(u1, v1) and t2 = f(u2, v2)
with f ∈ {enc, 〈 〉}. We know that either u1 6= u2 or v1 6= v2.
Assume w.l.o.g. that u1 6= u2. We can apply our induction
hypothesis to conclude that there exists c0 such u1ρ 6= u2ρ for
any Σ-renaming ρ such that c0 6∈ dom(ρ)∪img(ρ). Therefore,
considering any Σ-renaming that satisfies such a condition will
allow us to conclude. 
Lemma 8: Let Σ ⊆ Σ0, m ∈ MΣ, and u be a term in
T (Σc,X ∪ N ∪ Σ0). If m 6= uσ for any substitution σ, then
there exists c0 ∈ Σ such that for any Σ-renaming ρ such that
c0 6∈ dom(ρ) ∪ img(ρ), we have that mρ 6= (uρ)σ for any σ.
Proof. Ifm and u do not match because their structure differ,
then no renaming will change that. Else, the only possibility is
that there are two leaves of u that have the same variable, but
m has different subterms t1 6= t2 at those positions. Thanks
to Lemma 7 (item 3), there is a constant c0 such that for any
Σ0-renaming ρ with c0 /∈ dom(ρ) ∪ img(ρ), t1ρ 6= t2ρ. So
for such a ρ, mρ does not unify with uρ. 
We say that a renaming ρ is type-preserving if for any a ∈
dom(ρ) we have δ(aρ) = δ(a).
Lemma 9: Let P be a protocol type-compliant w.r.t.
(TP , δP) and ρ be a Σ-renaming where Σ = Σ0 r ΣP . Let
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(P ′;φ′;σ′) be a configuration such that P
tr
−→ (P ′;φ′;σ′) for
some tr. We have that P
trρ
−−→ (P ′;φ′ρ;σ′ρ).
Moreover, when ρ is type-preserving and (tr, φ′) is quasi-
well-typed w.r.t. (T , δ), then (trρ, φ′ρ) is quasi-well-typed
w.r.t. (T , δ).
Proof. We show this result by induction on the length ℓ of
the execution trace (P ; ∅; ∅)
tr
−→ (P ′;φ′;σ′).
Base case. In case ℓ = 0, the result trivially holds.
Induction case. In such a case, we have that:
P
tr′
−→ (P ′′; φ′′; σ′′)
α
−→ (P ′; φ′; σ′)
Thanks to our induction hypothesis, we know that
P
tr′ρ
−−→ (P ′′;φ′′ρ, σ′′ρ).
We distinguish two cases depending on the action α.
• α = in(c, R). In such a case, we have that P ′′ =
{in(c, u).P0} ∪ P0 for some u, P0, and P0. We have
also that φ′ = φ′′, and σ′ = σ′′ ⊎ σ0 for some σ0 such
that Rφ′′↓ = (uσ′′)σ0 and Rφ′′↓ ∈ MΣ. To conclude
that (P ′′; φ′′ρ; σ′′ρ)
αρ
−−→ (P ′; φ′ρ; σ′ρ), it remains to
show that (Rρ)(φ′′ρ)↓ = u(σ′′ρ)σ′0 and σ
′ρ = σ′′ρ ⊎ σ′0
for some σ′0. Since Rφ
′′↓ = (uσ′′)σ0, we deduce
that (Rφ′′↓)ρ = ((uσ′′)σ0)ρ, and thanks to Lemma 7
(item 1), we have that (Rφ′′)ρ↓ = ((uρ)(σ′′ρ))(σ0ρ).
Lastly, since ρ is a Σ-renaming and Σ = Σ0 r ΣP ,
we know that uρ = u, and therefore we have that
(Rρ)(φ′′ρ)↓ = (u(σ′′ρ))(σ0ρ). Moreover, since σ′ =
σ′′ ⊎ σ0, we have that σ′ρ = σ′′ρ ⊎ σ0ρ. Therefore,
choosing σ′0 = σ0ρ allows us to concude.
• α = out(c,w). In such a case, we have that P ′′ =
{out(c, u).P0} ∪ P0 for some u, P0, and P0. We have
also that σ′ = σ′′, and φ′ = φ′′ ∪ {w 7→ uσ′′}. To
conclude that (P ′′; φ′′ρ; σ′′ρ)
αρ
−−→ (P ′; φ′ρ; σ′ρ), it is
sufficient to show that (uσ′′)ρ = u(σ′′ρ). Actually, we
have that (uσ′′)ρ = (uρ)(σ′′ρ), and since Σ = Σ0rΣP ,
we deduce that uρ = u, and this allows us to conclude.
Note that δ(xσ′ρ) = δ(xσ′) since ρ is type-preserving, and
therefore the resulting trace is quasi-well-typed when (tr, φ′)
is quasi-well-typed. 
Theorem 2: Let P be a protocol type-compliant w.r.t.
(TP , δP) and Q be another protocol. Let Σ = ΣP ⊎
{c0⋆, c
1
⋆, c〈ω,ω〉}. We have that P 6⊑t Q w.r.t. Σ0 if, and only if,
there exists a witness tr of this non-inclusion w.r.t. Σ that only
contains simple recipes, and such that (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(P) for
some φ and (tr, φ) is quasi-well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP).
Proof. One direction is trivial. Therefore, we focus on the
other one. Let Σ⋆ = ΣP ⊎ { c ∈ Σ0 | δ0(c) = τ⋆ }.
Proposition 2 states that if P 6⊑t Q w.r.t. Σ0 then there exists
a witness tr of this non-inclusion w.r.t. Σ⋆ that only contains
simple recipes, and such that (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ⋆(P) for some
φ and (tr, φ) is quasi-well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP).
Let tr be such a witness having a minimal length. To
conclude, we establish the following claim.
Claim: There exists a type-preserving renaming ρ with
dom(ρ) ⊆ Σ⋆ r ΣP , and img(ρ) ⊆ Σ r ΣP such that trρ
is a witness of the non-inclusion P 6⊑t Q w.r.t. Σ.
Since tr is a witness of minimal length, we have that:
1) either tr is not a trace of Q but tr−1 (i.e. tr without its
last element) is a trace of Q;
2) or Q
tr
−→ (Q′;ψ;σQ) for some ψ (that is uniquely
defined) but φ 6⊑s ψ.
Case 1): tr is not a trace of Q. In such a case, we have that
tr = tr0 · α and we know that
P
tr0−−→ (P0;φ0;σ0)
α
−→ (P ′0;φ
′
0;σ
′
0)
and also that Q
tr0−−→ (Q0;ψ0; τ0). We distinguish several cases
depending on the action α and also the reason that prevents
this step to be mimicked in Q.
1) α = in(c, R), so there is in(c, u).P0 ∈ P0, but there is
no process on channel c starting with an input in Q0. Let
ρ0 be the renaming that maps any constant in Σ⋆ rΣP
to the constant c0⋆. Thanks to Lemma 9, we have that
P
tr0ρ0
−−−→ (P0;φ0ρ0;σ0ρ0)
αρ0
−−→ (P ′0;φ
′
0ρ0;σ
′
0ρ0)
and also that Q
tr0ρ0
−−−→ (Q0;ψ0ρ0; τ0ρ0). There is still
no process on channel c starting with an input in Q0ρ0,
and thus trρ0 is the witness we are looking for.
2) α = in(c, R) and there is in(c, u).P0 ∈ P0 as well as
in(c, v).Q0 ∈ Q0. Since tr is minimal and we know
that Rφ0↓ ∈ MΣ0 , we have also that Rψ0↓ ∈ MΣ0 .
Therefore, we know that Rψ0↓ does not unify with vτ0.
Thanks to Lemma 8, there is a constant c in Rψ0↓ such
that for any ρ with c /∈ dom(ρ) ∪ img(ρ), we have that
(Rψ0↓)ρ does not unify with vρ.
If c /∈ Σ⋆ rΣP , then ρ0 (as defined above) satisfies the
requirement. Therefore, applying Lemma 9, we obtain
that:
P
tr0ρ0
−−−→ (P0;φ0ρ0;σ0ρ0)
αρ0
−−→ (P ′0;φ
′
0ρ0;σ
′
0ρ0)
and also that Q
tr0ρ0
−−−→ (Q0;ψ0ρ0; τ0ρ0). We have also
that (Rψ0↓)ρ0 does not unify with vρ0, and we have
that
(Rψ0↓)ρ0 = Rψ0ρ0↓ = (Rρ0)(ψ0ρ0)↓
thanks to Lemma 7 (item 1). This allows us to conclude
that this step can not be mimicked by Q.
If c ∈ Σ⋆ r ΣP , then up to a bijective α-renaming, we
can assume that c = c1⋆. Let ρ1 be the renaming that
maps any constant in Σ⋆ r ΣP on c
0
⋆ except c
1
⋆ that is
left unchanged. Applying Lemma 9, we have that:
P
tr0ρ1
−−−→ (P0;φ0ρ1;σ0ρ1)
αρ1
−−→ (P ′0;φ
′
0ρ1;σ
′
0ρ1)
and also that Q
tr0ρ1
−−−→ (Q0;ψ0ρ1; τ0ρ1). We have also
that (Rψ′0↓)ρ1 does not unify with vρ1, and we have
that
(Rψ0↓)ρ1 = Rψ0ρ1↓ = (Rρ1)(ψ0ρ1)↓
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thanks to Lemma 7 (item 1). This allows us to conclude
that this step can not be mimicked by Q.
3) α = out(c,w). In this case, either there is no correspond-
ing output in Q0, or there is a corresponding output,
but the corresponding term is not a message. This can
happen in case an encryption with a non-atomic key
occurs in the outputted term. However, since renaming
will not change that, we easily conclude considering ρ0
as defined above.
Case 2): tr is a trace of Q. In such a case, we know that
P
tr
−→ (P0;φ0;σ0) and Q
tr
−→ (Q0;ψ0; τ0) for some ψ0 that is
uniquely defined, and we have that φ0 6⊑s ψ0. Following the
definition of static inclusion, we distinguish two cases:
1) There is a recipeR w.r.t. Σ⋆ such that Rφ0↓ is a message
but Rψ0↓ is not. Then by Lemma 7, there is a constant
c such that for any renaming ρ such that c /∈ dom(ρ) ∪
img(ρ), we have that Rψ0ρ↓ is not a message.
If c /∈ Σ⋆ r ΣP , then ρ0 (as defined above) is a
renaming such that c /∈ dom(ρ0) ∪ img(ρ0). Thanks
to Lemma 9, we have that P
trρ0
−−→ (P0;φ0ρ0;σ0ρ0) and
Q
trρ0
−−→ (Q0;ψ0ρ0; τ0ρ0). Note that the only constants
occuring in this execution are those of Σ. Thanks to
Lemma 7 (item 1), we have that (Rρ0)(φ0ρ0)↓ =
(Rφ0)ρ0↓ = (Rφ0↓)ρ0 ∈ M. However, we have that
(Rρ0)(ψ0ρ0)↓ = (Rψ0)ρ0↓ /∈ M. Therefore, we have
φ0ρ0 6⊑s ψ0ρ0.
If c ∈ Σ⋆ r ΣP , then up to a bijective α-renaming,
we can assume that c = c1⋆. Applying Lemma 9
with the renaming ρ1 as defined above, we have that
P
trρ1
−−→ (P0;φ0ρ1;σ0ρ1) and Q
trρ1
−−→ (Q0;ψ0ρ1; τ0ρ1).
Note that the only constants occuring in this execution
are those of Σ. Thanks to Lemma 7 (item 1), we have
that (Rρ1)(φ0ρ1)↓ = (Rφ0)ρ1↓ = (Rφ0↓)ρ1 ∈ M.
However, we have that (Rρ0)(ψ0ρ1)↓ = (Rψ)ρ1↓ /∈
M. Therefore, we have that φ0ρ1 6⊑s ψ0ρ1.
2) There are two recipes R1 and R2 w.r.t. Σ⋆ such that
R1φ0↓, R2φ0↓ are messages, and R1φ0↓ = R2φ0↓.
We may also assume that R1ψ0↓, R2ψ0↓ are messages.
However, we have that R1ψ0↓ 6= R2ψ0↓.
Then by Lemma 7 (item 3), there is a constant c such
that for any renaming ρ such that c /∈ dom(ρ)∪ img(ρ),
we have that R1ψ0ρ↓ 6= R1ψ0ρ↓.
If c /∈ Σ⋆ r ΣP , then ρ0 (as defined above) is a
renaming such that c /∈ dom(ρ0) ∪ img(ρ0). Thanks
to Lemma 9, we have that P
trρ0
−−→ (P0;φ0ρ0;σ0ρ0) and
Q
trρ0
−−→ (Q0;ψ0ρ0; τ0ρ0). Note that the only constants
occuring in this execution are those of Σ.
Thanks to Lemma 7 (item 1), we have that
(Riρ0)(φ0ρ0)↓ = (Riφ0)ρ0↓ = (Riφ0↓)ρ0 ∈ M
for i = 1, 2, and (Riρ0)(ψ0ρ0)↓ = (Riψ0)ρ0↓ =
(Riψ0↓)ρ0 ∈ M for i = 1, 2. Moreover, we have
that R1ψ0ρ0↓ 6= R1ψ0ρ0↓, i.e. (R1ρ0)(ψ0ρ0)↓ 6=
(R2ρ0)(ψ0ρ0)↓, whereas R1φ0↓ρ0 = R2φ0↓ρ0, i.e.
(R1ρ0)(φ0ρ0)↓ = (R2ρ0)(φ0ρ0)↓. Hence, we have our
witness of non-inclusion.
If c ∈ Σ⋆ r ΣP , then up to a bijective α-renaming,
we can assume that c = c1⋆. Applying Lemma 9
with the renaming ρ1 as defined above, we have that
P
trρ1
−−→ (P0;φ0ρ1;σ0ρ1) and Q
trρ1
−−→ (Q0;ψ0ρ1; τ0ρ1).
Note that the only constants occuring in this execution
are those of Σ.
Thanks to Lemma 7 (item 1), we have that
(Riρ1)(φ0ρ1)↓ = (Riφ0)ρ1↓ = (Riφ0↓)ρ1 ∈ M
for i = 1, 2, and (Riρ1)(ψ0ρ1)↓ = (Riψ0)ρ1↓ =
(Riψ0↓)ρ1 ∈ M for i = 1, 2. Moreover, we have
that R1ψ0ρ1↓ 6= R1ψ0ρ1↓, i.e. (R1ρ1)(ψ0ρ1)↓ 6=
(R2ρ1)(ψ0ρ1)↓, whereas R1φ0↓ρ1 = R2φ0↓ρ1, i.e.
(R1ρ1)(φ0ρ1)↓ = (R2ρ1)(φ0ρ1)↓. Hence, we have our
witness of non-inclusion.
This allows us to establish the claim and therefore concludes
the proof of our theorem. 
APPENDIX B
FROM STATIC EQUIVALENCE TO PLANNING
Lemma 1: Let φ, ψ be two frames with dom(φ) =
dom(ψ). Let Θ = 〈Fact0,Fact(φ, ψ),Concrete
+(RuleA)〉
and Π = 〈Θ, {att(u, v)}〉 for some u, v ∈ MΣ. We have
that Π has a solution if, and only if, there is a destructor-only
recipe R ∈ RΣ such that Rφ↓ = u, and Rψ↓ = v.
Proof. We show the two directions separately.
(⇒) Let π = r1, . . . , rn be a planning path from S0 to Sn,
and att(u, v) ∈ Sn. We show the result by induction on the
length of π.
Base case. We have that π is empty. In such a case, by
definition of S0, the result trivially holds.
Inductive case. We know that rn is an instance of one of the
abstract rules in RuleA, e.g.
att(enc(u1, u2), enc(v1, v2)), att(u2, v2) −→ att(u1, v1)
Thanks to our induction hypothesis, we know that there exist:
• R1 ∈ RΣ such that R1φ↓ = enc(u1, u2), and R1ψ↓ =
enc(v1, v2);
• R2 ∈ RΣ such that R2φ↓ = u2, and R2ψ↓ = v2.
Therefore, the recipe R = dec(R1, R2) allows us to conclude.
(⇐) Let R ∈ RΣ be a destructor-only recipe such that Rφ↓ =
u and Rψ↓ = v. We show the result by structural induction
on R.
Base case. We have that R is either w ∈ dom(φ) or a constant
in Σ. In both cases, by definition of S0, the empty path allows
us to conclude.
Inductive case. In such a case, we have that R = dec(R1, R2)
or R = proji(R
′) with i ∈ {1, 2}. We assume that R =
dec(R1, R2). Since we know that Rφ↓ and Rψ↓ are messages,
we have that:
• R1φ↓ and R2φ↓ are messages of the form enc(u1, u2)
and u2 for some terms u1, u2;
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• R1ψ↓ and R2ψ↓ are messages of the form enc(v1, v2)
and v2 for some terms v1, v2.
Thanks to our induction hypothesis, we know that there exists
π1 a planning path from S0 to S1 with att(R1φ↓, R1ψ↓) ∈ S1.
We have also that there exists π2 a planning path from S0 to
S2 with att(R2φ↓, R2ψ↓) ∈ S2. Therefore, the planning path
obtained by concatening π1 and π2 is a planning path from S0
to S1∪S2, and we have that att(enc(u1, u2), enc(v1, v2)) and
att(u2, v2) are both in S1 ∪S2. Applying the planning rule r:
att(enc(u1, u2), enc(v1, v2)), att(u2, v2) −→ att(u1, v1)
which is indeed an instance of a rule in RuleA, we obtain a
planning path from S0 to S such that att(Rφ↓, Rψ↓) ∈ S.
The other cases can be done in a similar way. 
We define the notion of static inclusion for destructors,
which is roughly the classical notion of static inclusion re-
stricted to destructor-only recipes.
Definition 12: A frame φ is statically included for destruc-
tors (w.r.t. Σ ⊆ Σ0) in a frame ψ, denoted φ ⊑des ψ, when
dom(φ) = dom(ψ), and:
1) for any destructor-only recipe R ∈ RΣ, Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0
implies that Rψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 ; and
2) for any destructor-only recipes R1, R2 ∈ RΣ with
R1φ↓, R2φ↓ ∈ MΣ0 , we have that R1φ↓ = R2φ↓
implies that R1ψ↓ = R2ψ↓;
3) for any destructor-only recipe R ∈ RΣ, Rφ↓ is an
atom different from c〈ω,ω〉 implies that Rψ↓ is an atom
different from c〈ω,ω〉.
We will show that this notion coincides with the regular
notion of static equivalence (see Proposition 3). To prove that,
we first establish some technical lemmas.
Lemma 10: Let φ and ψ be two frames such that φ ⊑des ψ.
Let R0 = f(at1, at2) with f ∈ {enc, 〈 〉} and at1, at2 ∈ Σ ∪
dom(φ) and such that R0φ↓ is a message. We have that R0ψ↓
is a message, and φ+ ⊑des ψ+ where φ+ = φ ⊎ {w ⊲ R0φ↓},
and ψ+ = ψ ⊎ {w ⊲ R0ψ↓} for any fresh variable w.
Proof. First, since φ ⊑des ψ, if R0φ↓ is a message then
R0ψ↓ is a message too.
We will establish this result by induction. More precisely,
we will show that:
1) If R is a destructor-only recipe with at most n destruc-
tors such that Rφ+↓ is a message, then Rψ+↓ is a
message.
2) If R1 (resp. R2) is a destructor-only recipe with n1 (resp.
n2) destructors such that n1 + n2 ≤ n, and R1φ+↓ =
R2φ
+↓ ∈ MΣ0 , then R1ψ
+↓ = R2ψ+↓.
3) If R is a destructor-only recipe with at most n destruc-
tors such that Rφ+↓ is an atom different from c〈ω,ω〉,
then Rψ+↓ is an atom different from c〈ω,ω〉.
Base cases.
1) R ∈ Σ ∪ dom(φ+), and Rφ+↓ ∈ MΣ0 . The only
interesting case is when R = w. In such a case, we
have that Rψ+ = wψ+ = R0ψ↓, and we have seen that
R0ψ↓ is a message.
2) R1, R2 ∈ Σ∪dom(φ+), and R1φ+↓ = R2φ+↓ ∈ MΣ0 .
In case both R1 and R2 are equal to w then the
result trivially holds; and in case both R1 and R2 are
different from w, then the result follows from φ ⊑des ψ.
Therefore, the only interesting case is when R1 = w
and R2 6= w (or the converse).
Case f = enc. In such a case, we have that
dec(R2φ↓, at2φ↓)↓ = at1φ↓. As dec(R2, at2) and
at1 are destructors recipes, φ ⊑des ψ applies
and dec(R2ψ↓, at2ψ↓)↓ = at1ψ↓. So R1ψ+↓ =
enc(at1ψ↓, at2ψ↓) = R2ψ↓ = R2ψ+↓.
Case f = 〈 〉. In such a case, we have that proji(R2φ↓) =
at iφ↓ for each i ∈ {1, 2}, and proji(R2) and at i are
destructor recipes, so proji(R2ψ↓)↓ = at iψ↓ for each
i ∈ {1, 2}, which implies that
R1ψ
+↓ = 〈at1ψ↓, at2ψ↓〉
= 〈proj1(R2ψ↓)↓, proj2(R2ψ↓)↓〉
= R2ψ
+↓
3) R ∈ Σ∪ dom(φ+), and Rφ+ is an atom different from
c〈ω,ω〉. The only interesting case is when R = w. In such
a case, we have that Rφ+↓ = wφ+ = f(at1φ↓, at2φ↓)
which is not an atom, thus contradiction.
Before proving the inductive case, we establish the following
claim.
Claim. Let Rd be a destructor-only recipe that contains at least
one destructor and such that w occurs in Rd, and Rdφ
+↓ ∈
MΣ0 . There exists a destructor-only recipe R
′
d smaller than
Rd (i.e. with less destructor symbols than Rd) such that
R′dφ
+↓ = Rdφ
+↓ and R′dψ
+↓ = Rdψ
+↓.
Proof of the claim. We distinguish two cases depending on
whether f = enc or f = 〈 〉.
Case f = enc. Then the destructor directly above a w must be a
dec (because proji(w)φ
+↓ = proji(enc(at1φ↓, at2φ↓)) would
never reduce, as a term only reduces when their subterms are
messages). Moreover, it is impossible that we have dec(R′,w)
for some recipe R′. In this case, we would have R′φ+↓ =
enc(t,wφ+↓) for some t as there is a reduction at top level in
dec(R′,w)φ+. But wφ+↓ is not atomic, so enc(t,wφ+↓) is not
a message, so dec(R′,w)φ+↓ does not reduce, contradiction.
So w only occurs in dec(w, R′) patterns. There is such a
pattern where vars(R′) ⊆ dom(φ), so we assume that we are
in this case. We have R′φ+↓ = R′φ↓. There is a reduction
at top level in dec(w, R′)φ+ = dec(enc(at1, at2), R
′)φ,
therefore R′φ↓ = R′φ+↓ = at2φ↓. As φ ⊑des ψ and
R′ and at2 are destructor recipes, R
′ψ↓ = at2ψ↓. So
dec(enc(at1ψ↓, at2ψ↓), R′ψ↓) = at1ψ↓.
We replace one occurrence of dec(w, R′) by at1 in Rd
and we get R′d. Clearly, R
′
d has less destructors than Rd and
R′dφ
+↓ = Rdφ+↓, R′dψ
+↓ = Rdψ+↓ because we proved
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that the equality between dec(w, R′) and at1 was true in both
frames.
Case f = 〈 〉. Similarly as above, the destructor occuring
directly above w must be proji for some i. But proji(w)φ
+↓ =
atiφ↓ and proji(w)ψ
+↓ = atiψ↓. So we replace one occur-
rence of proji(w) by at i in Rd and we get R
′
d. We have that
R′dφ
+↓ = Rdφ+↓ and R′dψ
+↓ = Rdψ+↓, and R′d has less
destructors than Rd. This concludes the proof of the claim.
Now, we assume that the result holds for n, and we establish
it for n+ 1.
1) Let R be a destructor recipe with n + 1 destructor
symbols, and assume that Rφ+↓ ∈ MΣ0 . The only
interesting case is when w occurs in R. Our claim
gives us a R′ with less than n destructors such that
R′φ+↓ = Rφ+↓ and R′ψ+↓ = Rψ+↓. Then, our
induction hypothesis (item 1) applies to R′ so Rψ+↓ =
R′ψ+↓ ∈ MΣ0 .
2) Let R1 (resp. R2) be a destructor recipe with n1
(resp. n2) destructor symbols with n1 + n2 ≤ n + 1,
and R1φ
+↓ = R2φ+↓ ∈ MΣ0 . In case w occurs
neither in R1 nor in R2, the result trivially holds.
Therefore, we assume w.l.o.g. that w occurs in R1. If
R1 is not atomic, our claim (item 2) gives us a R
′
1
such that R′1 has less destructor symbols than R1 and
R′1φ
+↓ = R1φ+↓, R′1ψ
+↓ = R1ψ+↓. Then, applying
our induction hypothesis (item 2) to R′1 and R2, we get
that R1ψ
+↓ = R′1ψ
+↓ = R2ψ
+↓.
Now assume that R1 = w. We can also assume that w
does not occur in R2 (else R2 is not atomic and contains
w: we just proved the result for this case). So R2φ
+↓ =
R2φ↓ and R2ψ+↓ = R2ψ↓. Now, we distinguish two
cases depending on f.
Case f = enc. In such a case, we have
that enc(at1φ↓, at2φ↓) = R1φ+↓ = R2φ+↓.
So at1φ↓ = dec(R2, at2)φ↓. As φ ⊑des ψ,
at1ψ↓ = dec(R2, at2)ψ↓, which implies that R1ψ+↓ =
enc(at1ψ↓, at2ψ↓) = R2ψ+↓.
Case f = 〈 〉. This case can be done in a similar way.
3) Let R be a destructor recipe with n + 1 destructors
symbols such that Rφ+↓ is an atom but is not c〈ω,ω〉.
Again, the only interesting case is when w occurs in R.
In such a case, our claim gives us a recipe R′ with less
than n destructor symbols such that R′φ+↓ = Rφ+↓ and
R′ψ+↓ = Rψ+↓. Applying our induction hypothesis
(item 3) on R′, we obtain that R′ψ+↓ is a message
different from c〈ω,ω〉. Therefore, Rψ
+↓ is a message
different from c〈ω,ω〉.
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 11: Let φ and ψ be two frames such that φ ⊑des ψ.
Let R be a recipe such that Rφ↓ is a message. We have that
Rψ↓ is a message and φ+ ⊑des ψ+ where φ+ = φ⊎{w⊲Rφ↓}
and ψ+ = ψ ⊎ {w ⊲ Rψ↓} for any fresh variable w.
Proof. We prove this result by structural induction on R.
Base case. R ∈ Σ∪dom(φ). In such a case, the result trivially
holds.
Inductive cases. In such a case, we have that R = f(R1, R2)
with f = {enc, dec, 〈 〉}, or R = proji(R
′) with i ∈ {1, 2}.
We distinguish two cases depending on whether f ∈ {enc, 〈 〉}
or f ∈ {dec, proj1, proj2}.
f is a destructor symbol. We assume w.l.o.g. that R =
dec(R1, R2). Since Rφ↓ is a message, we know that R1φ↓ and
R2φ↓ are messages. Thanks to our induction hypothesis, we
know that R1ψ↓ and R2ψ↓ are messages too, and φ′ ⊑des ψ′
where:
• φ′ = φ ⊎ {w1 ⊲ R1φ↓,w2 ⊲ R2φ↓};
• ψ′ = ψ ⊎ {w1 ⊲ R1ψ↓,w2 ⊲ R2ψ↓}.
Since f = dec is a destructor symbol, φ′ ⊑des ψ
′, and
f(R1φ↓, R2φ↓)↓ = Rφ↓ is a message, we deduce that
f(R1ψ↓, R2ψ↓)↓ = Rψ↓ is a message. We have also that
φ′′ ⊑des ψ′′ where φ′′ = φ′ ⊎ {w ⊲ Rφ↓} and ψ′′ =
ψ′ ⊎ {w ⊲ Rψ↓}, and thus we conclude that φ+ ⊑des ψ+.
f is a constructor symbol. We assume w.l.o.g. that R =
enc(R1, R2). Thanks to our induction hypothesis, we know
that φ′ ⊑des ψ′ where:
• φ′ = φ ⊎ {w1 ⊲ R1φ↓,w2 ⊲ R2φ↓};
• ψ′ = ψ ⊎ {w1 ⊲ R1ψ↓,w2 ⊲ R2ψ↓}.
Since f = enc, relying on Lemma 10, we obtain that Rψ↓ is
a message, and φ′′ ⊑des ψ′′ where φ′′ = φ′ ⊎ {w ⊲ Rφ↓} and
ψ′′ = ψ′⊎{w⊲Rψ↓}, and thus we conclude that φ+ ⊑des ψ+.
This conclude the proof. 
Now, we prove that the two notions of static inclusion
coincide.
Proposition 3: Let φ and ψ be two frames. We have that
φ ⊑s ψ if, and only if, φ ⊑des ψ.
Proof. Let φ and ψ be two frames. We show the two
directions separately.
(⇒) We assume that φ ⊑s ψ, and we have to establish that
φ ⊑des ψ. First, the items 1 and 2 of Definition 12 are direct
consequences of the definition of static inclusion. Now, let R
be a destructor recipe such that Rφ↓ is atomic and different
from c〈ω,ω〉. Let c be a constant in Σ0, and let R
′ = enc(c, R).
We have that R′φ↓ = enc(c, Rφ↓) is a message. Therefore,
R′ψ↓ = enc(c, Rψ↓) is a message as φ ⊑s ψ. Hence, we have
that Rψ↓ is atomic and different from c〈ω,ω〉. This allows us
to concllude.
(⇐) We assume that φ ⊑des ψ, and we have to establish
that φ ⊑s ψ. We show that the two items of Definition 3 are
satisfied. First, let R be a recipe such that Rφ↓ is a message.
Thanks to Lemma 11, we know that Rψ↓ is a message too.
Second, let R1 and R2 be two recipes such that R1φ↓ =
R2ψ↓ ∈ MΣ0 . Thanks to Lemma 11, we obtain that φ
′ ⊑des
ψ′ where:
• φ′ = φ ⊎ {w1 ⊲ R1φ↓,w2 ⊲ R2φ↓},
• ψ′ = ψ ⊎ {w1 ⊲ R1ψ↓,w2 ⊲ R2ψ↓}.
In particular the equation w1 = w2 holds in φ
′ and w1 and
w2 are destructor recipes so this equation also holds in ψ
′, i.e.
R1ψ↓ = R2ψ↓. 
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Now we can state and prove our main proposition:
Proposition 1: Let φ and ψ be two frames with dom(φ) =
dom(ψ), and Θ = 〈Fact0,Fact(φ, ψ),R〉 where
R = Concrete(RuleA) ∪Rtestfail ∪R
atom
fail .
Let Π = 〈Θ, {bad}〉. We have that φ 6⊑s ψ if, and only if, Π
has a solution.
Proof. First, thanks to Proposition 3, it is sufficient to show
that φ 6⊑des ψ if, and only if, Π has a solution. We show the
two directions separately.
(⇒) We have that φ 6⊑des ψ. Following the definition of ⊑des,
we consider 3 cases.
1) There is a destructor recipe R such that Rφ↓ ∈ MΣ0
but Rψ↓ 6∈ MΣ0 . We consider one having a minimal
size. Since both φ and ψ are frames, we have that
R = dec(R1, R2) or R = proji(R
′) with i ∈ {1, 2}.
We assume w.l.o.g. that R = dec(R1, R2), and by
minimality of R we have that R1ψ↓ and R2ψ↓ are
in MΣ0 . Thanks to Lemma 1, we know that there
exists a plan π1 (resp. π2) or att(R1φ↓, R1ψ↓) (resp.
att(R2φ↓, R2ψ↓)). We consider the plan obtained by
“concatening” the plans π1 and π2, and we consider the
rule r of the form:
att(R1φ↓, R1ψ↓), att(R2φ↓, R2ψ↓) → bad
which is indeed an instance of a rule in
Concrete−(RuleA) since R1φ↓ = enc(u1, u2) for
some u1, u2, and enc(u1, u2), R1ψ↓, R2ψ↓ are
messages whereas dec(R1ψ↓, R2ψ↓)↓ is not a message.
This rule r can be triggered and leads to bad. Therefore,
Π has as solution.
2) There are two destructor recipes R1 and R2 such that
R1φ↓ = R2φ↓ ∈ MΣ0 whereas R1ψ↓ 6= R2ψ↓. First,
thanks to the first item, we may assume that R1ψ↓ and
R2ψ↓ are both in MΣ0 . Therefore, thanks to Lemma 1,
we know that there exists a plan π1 (resp. π2) of or
att(R1φ↓, R1ψ↓) (resp. att(R2φ↓, R2ψ↓)). We consider
the plan obtained by “concatening” the plans π1 and π2,
and we consider the rule r of the form:
att(R1φ↓, R1ψ↓), att(R2φ↓, R2ψ↓) → bad
which is indeed an instance of a rule Rtestfail . Therefore,
we have shown that Π has a solution.
3) There is a destructor recipe R such that Rφ↓ is an
atom different from c〈ω,ω〉 whereas Rψ↓ is either not
an atom or it is c〈ω,ω〉. First, thanks to the first item,
we may assume that Rψ↓ is in MΣ0 . Therefore, thanks
to Lemma 1, we know that there exists a plan π of or
att(Rφ↓, Rψ↓). We consider the rule r of the form:
att(Rφ↓, Rψ↓) → bad
which is indeed an instance of a rule Ratomfail , and which
leads to a solution for Π. Therefore, we have also that
Π has a solution.
So in any case we have shown that Π has a solution.
(⇐) We have a plan of bad. We consider such a plan r1, . . . , rn
of minimal length. Since this plan is mimimal, we know that
r1, . . . , rn−1 are rules in Concrete
+(RuleA), and therefore, we
can rely on Lemma 1 to conclude that there exists a destructor-
only recipe R such that Rφ↓ = u and Rψ↓ = v for any
att(u, v) ∈ Sn−1 (the state resulting from the application of
r1, . . . , rn−1). Then, in order to derive bad, we have applied
either a rule in Concrete−(RuleA), or a rule in Rule
test
fail , or a
rule in Ruleatomfail . The two last cases are quite obvious, and we
easily derive a witness of φ 6⊑des ψ relying on item 2 (resp.
item 3) of Definition 12. Regarding the first case, according to
the definition of Concrete−(RuleA), we distinguish two cases:
• rn = att(〈u1, u2〉, v) −→ bad with v not a pair; or
• rn = att(enc(u1, u2), v), att(u2, v
′) −→ bad with v not
of the form enc(v0, v
′) for some v0.
Moreover, we have destructor-only recipes R1 (and R2) allow-
ing us to derive these facts. In the first case, we conclude using
the recipe proj1(R1) and checking whether it is a message or
not. In the second case, we do the same with dec(R1, R2). 
APPENDIX C
FROM TRACE EQUIVALENCE TO PLANNING
Lemma 12: Let r = Pre, att(u, v) −→ Add;Del be an
abstract rule. Let σ be a grounding substitution for r such
that δP(xσ)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r). Let C be a
constructor context such that uσ = C[u1, . . . , un] and vσ =
C[v1, . . . , vn]. There exists r
′ ∈ Flat(r):
r′ = Pre′, att(u′1, v
′
1), . . . , att(u
′
n, v
′
n) −→ Add
′;Del′
and σ′ a grounding substitution for r′ such that:
1) δP(xσ
′)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r′);
2) (Pre′, Add′, Del′)σ′ = (Pre,Add,Del)σ; and
3) att(u, v)σ = att(C[u′1, . . . , u
′
n], C[v
′
1, . . . , v
′
n])σ
′.
Proof. We first establish the following claim:
Claim. Let r = Pre, att(u, v) −→ Add;Del be an abstract
rule. Let σ be a grounding substitution for r such that
δP(xσ)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r). Let f ∈ Σc be
such that uσ = f(u1, u2) and vσ = f(v1, v2) for some
terms u1, u2, v1, v2. Then u is decomposable, and r1 =
decompo(r, att(u, v)) is of the following form:
r1 = Pre1, att(u
′
1, v
′
1), att(u
′
2, v
′
2) −→ Add1;Del1
Moreover, there is a grounding substitution σ1 for r1 such
that:
1) δP(xσ1)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r1);
2) (Pre1, Add1, Del1)σ1 = (Pre,Add,Del)σ; and
3) uσ = f(u′1, u
′
2)σ1 and vσ = f(v
′
1, v
′
2)σ1.
Proof of the Claim. We have that uσ = f(u1, u2) and we
know that δP(xσ)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r). Therefore,
we know that u is decomposable. We have that
split(att(u, v)) = (f, {att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2)}, σP , σQ)
with δP(x1) = τ1, δP(x2) = τ2, σP = mgu(u, f(x1, x2))
is quasi-well-typed, and σQ = mgu(v, f(y1, y2)). Note that
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σQ 6= ⊥ since vσ = f(v1, v2). Moreover, when u (resp v)
is not a variable, we assume w.l.o.g. that x1, x2 (resp.
y1, y2) do not occur in img(σP) (resp. img(σQ)). Let r1 =
decompo(r, att(u, v)). We have that:
r1 = [Pre, att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2) −→ Add;Del](σP ⊎ σQ)
Let σleft = σ|vars left(r) and σ
right = σ|vars right(r). Note that
vars left(r) ∩ vars right(r) = ∅, and thus σ = σleft ⊎ σright.
Now, we make a distinction depending on whether u (resp.
v) is a variable or not. In case u is a variable, say zu, then we
have that σP = {zu 7→ f(x1, x2)}, and we let σleft1 = σ
left ⊎
{x1 7→ u1, x2 7→ u2}. Otherwise, we have that u = f(a1, a2),
and σP = {x1 7→ a1, x2 7→ a2}, and we let σleft1 = σ
left.
We proceed similarly for v. It remains to show that r1 and
σ1 = σ
left
1 ⊎ σ
right
1 as defined above satisfy the requirements.
We establish each property separately,
1) We have that δP(xσ1) = δP(xσ
left
1 ) = δP(xσ)  δP(x)
for any x ∈ vars left(r1) r {x1, x2}; and δP(xiσ1) =
δP(xiσ
left
1 ) = δP(ui) = τi  δP(xi) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Hence the result.
2) In case u is a variable, we have that (zuσP)σ
left
1 = zuσ,
and similarly for v. Therefore, it is easy to see that
(Pre,Add,Del)(σP ⊎ σQ)σ1 = (Pre,Add,Del)σ.
3) We have that f(u′1, u
′
2)σ1 = f(x1σP , x2σP )σ1 = uσ,
and similarly for v.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
Now we prove the main result by induction on C. The base
case, i.e. C is empty, is obvious. We simply choose r′ = r.
Assume now that C = f(C1, C2). From our claim, we get
r1 = decompo(r, att(u, v)) of the following form
r1 = Pre1, att(u
′
1, v
′
1), att(u
′
2, v
′
2) −→ Add1;Del1
and a substitution σ1 grounding for r1 such that:
1) δP(xσ1)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r1);
2) (Pre1, Add1, Del1)σ1 = (Pre,Add,Del)σ; and
3) uσ = f(u′1, u
′
2)σ1 and vσ = f(v
′
1, v
′
2)σ1.
In particular we have that Ci[u1, . . . , un] = u
′
iσ1 and
Ci[v1, . . . , vn] = v
′
iσ1 for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
Now we write
r1 = Pre
′
1, att(u
′
2, v
′
2) −→ Add1;Del1
and we apply our induction hypothesis with context C2 and
substitution σ1. We get a rule r2 ∈ Flat(r1) such that
r2 = Pre2, att(u
2
1, v
2
1), . . . , att(u
2
n, v
2
n) −→ Add2;Del2
and a substitution σ2 grounding for r2 such that:
1) δP(xσ2)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r2);
2) (Pre2, Add2, Del2)σ2 = (Pre
′
1, Add1, Del1)σ1;
3) u′2σ1 = C2[u
2
1, . . . , u
2
n]σ2, and similarly v
′
2σ1 =
C2[v
2
1 , . . . , v
2
n]σ2.
We can write:
r2 = Pre
′
2, att(u
′′
1 , v
′′
1 ) −→ Add2;Del2
where u′′1σ2 = u
′
1σ1 and v
′′
1σ2 = v
′
1σ1 and we apply our
induction hypothesis with context C1 and substitution σ2. We
get a rule r3 ∈ Flat(r2) such that
r3 = Pre3, att(u
3
1, v
3
1), . . . , att(u
3
n, v
3
n) −→ Add3;Del3
and a substitution σ3 grounding for r3 such that:
1) δP(xσ3)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r3);
2) (Pre3, Add3, Del3)σ3 = (Pre
′
2, Add2, Del2)σ2,
3) u′′1σ2 = C1[u
3
1, . . . , u
3
n]σ3, and similarly v
′′
2σ2 =
C1[v
3
1 , . . . , v
3
n]σ3.
We have that r3 ∈ Flat(r) and it remains to check that r3
and σ3 as defined above satsify our three conditions. First, we
have seen that δP(xσ3)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r3).
Second, we have that
(Add3, Del3)σ3 = (Add2, Del2)σ2
= (Add1, Del1)σ1
= (Add,Del)σ
As Pre3σ3 = Pre
′
2σ2, we have
Pre3 = Pre
′
3, att(u
4
1, v
4
1), . . . , att(u
4
n, v
4
n)
for some Pre′3 where u
4
iσ3 = u
2
iσ2 and v
4
i σ3 = v
2
i σ2 for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, we have that:
Pre′3σ3, att(u
4
1, v
4
1)σ3, . . . , att(u
4
n, v
4
n)σ3, att(u
′′
1 , v
′′
1 )σ2
= Pre3σ3, att(u
′′
1 , v
′′
1 )σ2
= Pre′2σ2, att(u
′′
1 , v
′′
1 )σ2
= Pre2σ2, att(u
2
1, v
2
1)σ2, . . . , att(u
2
n, v
2
n)σ2
= Pre′1σ1, att(u
2
1, v
2
1)σ2, . . . , att(u
2
n, v
2
n)σ2
= Pre1σ1, att(u
′
1, v
′
1)σ1, att(u
2
1, v
2
1)σ2, . . . , att(u
2
n, v
2
n)σ2
= Preσ, att(u′1, v
′
1)σ1, att(u
2
1, v
2
1)σ2, . . . , att(u
2
n, v
2
n)σ2
Hence, we have that Pre′3σ3 = Preσ. Lastly, we have that:
uσ
= f(u′1, u
′
2)σ1
= f(u′′1σ2, C2[u
2
1, . . . , u
2
n]σ2)
= f(C1[u
3
1, . . . , u
3
n], C2[u
4
1, . . . , u
4
n])σ3.
We can establish in a similar way that vσ =
f(C1[v
3
1 , . . . , v
3
n], C2[v
4
1 , . . . , v
4
n])σ3, and this concludes
the proof. 
For the next lemmas, we need to be more specific on
how the fact bad has appeared. Therefore, from now on,
we consider three facts instead: bad-proto, bad-flat, and
bad-concrete. Moreover, we assume that in protocol rules, bad
is replaced by bad-proto, in flattening rules, bad is replaced
by bad-flat, and in concretization rules bad is replaced by
bad-concrete. When the precise origin of the failure does not
matter, we simply write bad (meaning one of the three cases
above).
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Lemma 13: Let r be an abstract protocol rule. Let r′ ∈
Flat(r) written as
r′ = state, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(un, vn) −→ Add;Del
where state is a state fluent.
• Either we have bad-flat /∈ Add, and then there exists a
constructor context C and a substitution τ such that
rτ = state, att(u, v) → Add;Del.
where u = C[u1, . . . , un] and v = C[v1, . . . , vn].
• Or Add = bad-flat, Del = ∅ and there ex-
ists a constructor context C, a substitution τ and a
term v and two sets Add0 and Del0 such that rτ =
state, att(C[u1, . . . , un], v) −→ Add0;Del0 but v does
not unify with C.
Proof. As r′ ∈ Flat(r), there exists a sequence r0, . . . , rn of
rules, and a sequence f0, . . . , fn−1 of facts, such that r0 = r,
rn = r
′ and for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, we have that ri+1 =
decompo(ri, fi). We establish the result by induction on n.
The base case, i.e. n = 0, is trivial.
Assume that we have the result for n. Let
rn = staten, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(um, vm) −→ Addn;Deln.
and rn+1 = decompo(rn, fn) = Pren+1 −→
Addn+1;Deln+1. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that fn = att(um, vm).
First case. bad-flat /∈ Addn+1. Then, as rn+1 =
decompo(rn, fn), bad-flat /∈ Addn. By induction hypothesis,
there exist C and τn such that:
rτn = staten, att(u0, v0) −→ Addn;Deln
where u0 = Cn[u1, . . . , um] and v0 = Cn[v1, . . . , vm].
We have split(fn) = (f, S, σP , σQ) with S =
{att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2)}, σP = mgu(um, f(x1, x2)), and
σQ = mgu(vm, f(y1, y2)). Moreover, since bad-flat /∈
Addn+1, we have that σQ 6= ⊥. We get the following rule
rn+1:
(staten, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(um−1, vm−1),
att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2) −→ Addn;Deln)(σP ⊎ σQ)
Let τ = τn(σP ⊎ σQ) and C = Cn[ , . . . , f( , )]. We have
that
rτn(σP ⊎ σQ)
= staten(σP ⊎ σQ), att(u0σP , v0σQ) −→ Addn(σP ⊎ σQ);
Deln(σP ⊎ σQ).
It only remains to establish that u0σP =
C[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , x1σP , x2σP ] (and similarly for v0).
We have that:
u0σP
= Cn[u1, . . . , um]σP
= Cn[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , f(x1, x2)σP ]
= C[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , x1σP , x2σP ]
Hence, this case is proved.
Second case. bad-flat ∈ Addn+1 but bad-flat /∈ Addn. By
induction hypothesis, there exist C and τn such that:
rτn = staten, att(u0, v0) −→ Addn;Deln
where u0 = Cn[u1, . . . , um] and v0 = Cn[v1, . . . , vm].
We have split(fn) = (f, S, σP ,⊥) with S =
{att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2)}, σP = mgu(um, f(x1, x2)). We get
the following rule rn+1:
(staten, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(um−1, vm−1),
att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2) −→ bad-flat)σP
Let τ = τn.σP and C = Cn[ , . . . , f( , )].
We have that
rτnσP)
= statenσP , att(u0σP , v0) −→ AddnσP ;
DelnσP
It only remains to establish that u0σP =
C[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , x1σP , x2σP ] but v0 does not unify
with C. We have that:
u0σP
= Cn[u1, . . . , um]σP
= Cn[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , f(x1, x2)σP ]
= C[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , x1σP , x2σP ]
and v0 = Cn[v1, . . . , vm], so if it unifies with C then vm
unifies with f( , ) so with f(y1, y2) as y1, y2 are variables.
But it is impossible as σQ = ⊥. So v0 does not unify with C,
which concludes the proof of this second case.
Third case. bad-flat ∈ Addn+1 and bad-flat ∈ Addn. By
induction hypothesis, there exist C and τn such that:
rτn = staten, att(u0, v0) −→ Add0;Del0
where u0 = Cn[u1, . . . , um] and v0 does not unify with Cn.
We have split(fn) = (f, S, σP , σQ) with S =
{att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2)}, σP = mgu(um, f(x1, x2)) and
σQ = mgu(vm, f(y1, y2)).
Subcase 3.1. σQ 6= ⊥. We get the following rule rn+1:
(staten, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(um−1, vm−1),
att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2) −→ bad-flat)(σP ⊎ σQ)
Let τ = τn(σP ⊎ σQ) and C = Cn[ , . . . , f( , )]. We have
that
rτn(σP ⊎ σQ)
= staten(σP ⊎ σQ), att(u0σP , v0σQ) −→ Addn(σP ⊎ σQ);
Deln(σP ⊎ σQ).
It only remains to establish that u0σP =
C[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , x1σP , x2σP ] but v0σQ does not
unify with C. We have that:
u0σP
= Cn[u1, . . . , um]σP
= Cn[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , f(x1, x2)σP ]
= C[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , x1σP , x2σP ]
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and v0σQ does not unify with Cn, so it does not unify with
C, which concludes the proof of this subcase.
Subcase 3.2. σQ = ⊥. We get the following rule rn+1:
(staten, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(um−1, vm−1),
att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2) −→ bad-flat)σP
Let τ = τnσP and C = Cn[ , . . . , f( , )]. We have that
rτnσP
= statenσP , att(u0σP , v0) −→ AddnσP ;
DelnσP .
It only remains to establish that u0σP =
C[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , x1σP , x2σP ] but v0 does not unify
with C. We have that:
u0σP
= Cn[u1, . . . , um]σP
= Cn[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , f(x1, x2)σP ]
= C[u1σP , . . . , um−1σP , x1σP , x2σP ]
and v0 does not unify with Cn, so it does not unify with C,
which concludes the proof of this subcase, and hence of the
lemma. 
Lemma 14: Let r be an abstract rule, r = Pre, att(u, v) −→
Add;Del. Let σ be a substitution grounding for vars left(r)
such that δP(xσ)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r), and f a
constructor function symbol such that uσ = f(u1, u2). Assume
that Add = bad or v does not unify with f( , ).
Then u is decomposable. Let r′ defined by
r′ = decompo(r, att(u, v))
= Pre′, att(u′1, v
′
1), att(u
′
2, v
′
2) −→ bad
If Add 6= bad then there is a substitution σ′ grounding for
vars left(r) such that δP(xσ
′)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r′),
Pre′σ′ = Preσ, f(u′1, u
′
2)σ
′ = uσ and v′1, v
′
2 are distinct
variables that do not occur elsewhere in r′.
If Add = bad and Del = ∅, the result still holds except
that nothing is required on v′1 and v
′
2 if v unifies with f( , ).
Proof. uσ = f(u1, u2) so either u is not atomic or u is
a variable and δP(uσ)  δP(u) = f(δP (u1), δP(u2)). So in
both cases u is decomposable.
We first consider the case where Add 6= bad.
As v does not unify with f(v1, v2) for any v1, v2,
split(att(u, v)) = (f, {att(x1, y1), att(x2, y2)}, σP ,⊥)
where σP = mgu(u, f(x1, x2)) and δP(xi) = δP(ui).
First case. u is a variable. We have σP = {u 7→ f(x1, x2)}.
Let r′ defined by
r′ = decompo(r, att(u, v))
= PreσP , att(x1σP , y1), att(x2σP , y2) −→ bad
and σ′ defined by σ′ = {x1 7→ u1;x2 7→ u2} ∪ σ}
As x1, x2 /∈ dom(σ), σ′ is well-defined. We have
δP(xσ
′)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(σ
′). Moreover,
Pre′σ′ = PreσPσ
′ = Preσ as σ′ coincide with σ on dom(σ)
and uσP .σ
′ = uσ. Finally, y1, y2 are variables that do not
occur elsewhere in r′. So it concludes the proof for this case.
Second case. u = f(a1, a2) for some ai with aiσ = ui for
each i ∈ {1, 2}. We have σP = {x1 7→ a1;x2 7→ a2}. Let r′
defined by
r′ = decompo(r, att(u, v))
= PreσP , att(x1σP , y1), att(x2σP , y2) −→ bad
and σ′ defined by σ′ = σ.
We have δP(xσ
′)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(σ′). More-
over, Pre′σ′ = PreσPσ
′ = Preσ as PreσP = Pre because
dom(σP ) ∩ vars(Pre) = ∅. Finally, y1, y2 are variables that
do not occur elsewhere in r′. So it concludes the proof of the
main result.
We now consider the case where Add = bad.
Now, if v does unify with f( , ), then, the hypotheses
of Lemma 12 are satisfied, so we get its conclusion, which
implies the desired result. 
For the next lemmas, we need to define the relation =left
on facts as f1 =
left f2 iff f1 = att(u, v), f2 = att(u
′, v′) with
u = u′, or f1 = state
c
P,Q(σP , σQ), f2 = state
c′
P ′,Q′(σ
′
P , σ
′
Q)
with c = c′, P = P ′ and σP = σ
′
P . We extend this definition
to Pre.
Lemma 15: Let r = Pre, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(un, vn) −→
bad. Let σ be a substitution grounding for vars left(r) and such
that δP(xσ)  δP(x) for each x ∈ vars left(r).
Let C1, . . . , Cn be constructor contexts. We assume that
uiσ = Ci[u
i
1, . . . , u
i
ki
]. Then there exists r′ ∈ Flat(r) such
that r′ = Pre′, att(s11, t
1
1), . . . , att(s
n
kn
, tnkn) −→ bad and σ
′
such that uji = s
j
iσ
′ and Pre′σ′ =left Preσ and the tji are
any terms.
Proof. We first prove the following claim:
Claim. Let r = Pre, att(u, v) −→ bad. Let σ be a substitu-
tion grounding for vars left(r) and such that δP(xσ)  δP(x)
for each x ∈ vars left(r).
Let C be a constructor context. We assume that uσ =
C[u1, . . . , un]. Then there exists r
′ ∈ Flat(r) such that
r′ = Pre′, att(u′1, v1), . . . , att(u
′
n, vn) −→ bad and σ
′ such
that ui = u
′
iσ
′ and Pre′σ′ =left Preσ.
Proof of the claim. We proceed by induction on C. The
base case is obvious. We assume C = f(C1, C2). By
Lemma 14, we have that u is decomposable, and r1 =
decompo(r, att(u, v)) = Pre1, att(u
1
1, v1), att(u
1
2, v2) −→
bad. There exists a σ1 such that σ1 is grounding for
vars left(r1) and Pre1σ1 = Preσ, f(u
′
1, u
′
2)σ1 = uσ.
Recall that uσ = C[u1, . . . , un] =
f(C1[u1, . . . , um], C2[um+1, . . . , un]). By induction
hypothesis on C1 with r1 = Pre
′
1, att(u
′
1, v1) −→ bad,
we get that there exists r2 ∈ Flat(r1) ⊂ Flat(r) such that
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r2 = Pre2, att(u
2
1, v
′
1), . . . , att(u
2
m, v
′
m) −→ bad and a σ2
such that u2iσ2 = ui for i ≤ m, and Pre2σ2 =
left Pre′1σ1.
By induction hypothesis on C2 with r2 =
Pre′2, att(u
′
2, v2) −→ bad, we get that there
exists r3 ∈ Flat(r2) ⊂ Flat(r) such that
r3 = Pre3, att(u
3
m+1, v
′
m+1), . . . , att(u
3
n, v
′
n) −→ bad and a
σ3 such that u
3
iσ3 = ui for i > m, and Pre3σ3 =
left Pre′2σ2.
So we have that Pre3 =
left
Pre′3, att(u
3
1, v
′′
1 ), . . . , att(u
3
m, v
′′
m) for some Pre
′
3 where
u3iσ3 = u
2
iσ2 for each i ≤ m. Hence we have that
Pre′3σ3, att(u
3
1, v
′′
1 )σ3, . . . , att(u
4
m, v
′′
m)σ3, att(u
′
2, v2)σ2
= Pre3σ3, att(u
′
2, v2)σ2
=left Pre′2σ2, att(u
′
2, v2)σ2
=left Pre2σ2, att(u
2
1, v
′
1)σ2, . . . , att(u
2
m, v
′
m)σ2
=left Pre′1σ1, att(u
2
1, v
′
1)σ2, . . . , att(u
2
m, v
′
m)σ2
=left Pre1σ1, att(u
1
2, v2)σ1, att(u
2
1, v
′
1)σ2, . . . , att(u
2
m, v
′
m)σ2
=left Preσ, att(u12, v2)σ1, att(u
2
1, v
′
1)σ2, . . . , att(u
2
m, v
′
m)σ2
We deduce that Preσ =left Pre′3σ3 and ui = u
3
iσ3 for
each i. It concludes the proof of the claim.
Now we want to prove the main result. We proceed by
induction on the number n of contexts. The base case (n = 1)
is our claim. Consider the inductive case.
We have r = Pre, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(un+1, vn+1) −→ bad.
We define Pre′ = Pre, att(un+1, vn+1). We apply our induc-
tion hypothesis on r = Pre′, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(un, vn) −→
bad and we get a r1 ∈ Flat(r) such that r1 =
Pre1, att(s
1
1, t
1
1), . . . , att(s
n
kn
, tnkn) −→ bad and σ1 such that
uji = s
j
iσ1 and Pre1σ1 =
left Pre′σ.
We can apply our claim on r1 = Pre
′
1, att(u
′
n+1, v
′
n+1) −→
bad for some adequate Pre′1, where u
′
n+1σ1 = un+1σ
and v′n+1σ1 = vn+1σ1. We get a rule r2 =
Pre2, att(α1, β1), . . . , att(αkn+1 , βkn+1) −→ bad and σ2 such
that Pre2σ2 =
left Pre′1σ1 and Cn+1[α1, . . . , αkn+1 ]σ2 =
u′n+1σ1. So Pre2 = Pre
′
2, att(γ
1
1 , δ
1
1), . . . , att(γ
n
kn
, δnkn)
where γji σ2 = s
j
iσ1 for any i, j. So Pre
′
2σ2 =
left
Pre1σ1\{att(un+1σ1, vn+1σ1)} =left Preσ. 
Lemma 16: Let r = Pre, att(u, v) −→ Add;Del be a rule, σ
be a grounding substitution for vars left(r) such that δP(xσ) 
δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r), and C a linear context built
on Σc only Assume uσ = C[u1, . . . , un] and v and C are not
unifiable.
Then there exists r′ ∈ Flat(r) such that r′ =
Pre′, att(u′1, v1), . . . , att(u
′
n, vn) −→ bad and σ
′ such that
ui = u
′
iσ
′ and Pre′σ′ =left Preσ.
Proof. Let r = Pre, att(u, v) −→ Add;Del be a rule, σ be
a grounding substitution for vars left(r) such that δP(xσ) 
δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r), and C a linear context built
on Σc only.
Assume uσ = C[u1, . . . , un] whereas v and C are not
unifiable. Take C′ a maximal prefix of C such that v and C′
are unifiable. We can define σ′ such that σ′ = σ on vars left(r)
and σ′ unifies v with C′: vσ′ = C′[v1, . . . , vn].
By Lemma 12, there exists r1 ∈ Flat(r) in the form:
r1 = Pre1, att(u
′
1, v
′
1), . . . , att(u
′
n, v
′
n) −→ Add1;Del1
and σ1 a grounding substitution such that:
1) δP(xσ1)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r1);
2) (Pre1, Add1, Del1)σ1 = (Pre,Add,Del)σ
′; and
3) att(u, v)σ′ = att(C′[u′1, . . . , u
′
n], C
′[v′1, . . . , v
′
n])σ1.
Now, we have C = C′[C1, . . . , Cn]. But v and C where not
unifiable, and by maximality of C′, we assume without loss
of generality that v′1 and C1 are not unifiable.
As C1 is a context built on Σc only, C1 is not a leaf (oth-
erwise v′1 would be unifiable with C1). So C1 = f(C
′′
1 , C
′′
2 ).
By maximality of C′, v′1 is not even unifiable with f( , ). u
′
1
is unifiable with C1 as uσ = C[u1, . . . , un].
We can apply Lemma 14 on rule r1 = Pre
′
1, att(u
′
1, v
′
1) −→
Add1;Del1, u
′
1 is decomposable and the following rule is
well-defined:
r2 = decompo(r1, att(u
′
1, v
′
1))
= Pre2, att(u
′′
1 , v
′′
1 ), att(u
′′
2 , v
′′
2 ) −→ bad
Moreover, there is a substitution σ2 such that δP(xσ2) 
δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r2), Pre2σ2 = Pre′1σ1,
f(u′1, u
′
2)σ
′ = u′1σ and v
′
1, v
′
2 are distinct variables that do
not occur elsewhere in r2.
Now we write r2 =
Pre′2, att(u
′′
1 , v
′′
1 ), att(u
′′
2 , v
′′
2 ), att(α2, β2), . . . , att(αn, βn) −→
bad, where αiσ2 = u
′
iσ1 and βiσ2 = v
′
iσ1 for each i ≥ 2.
We can apply Lemma 15 with contexts C′′1 , C
′′
2 , C2, . . . , Cn.
We get a rule
r3 =
Pre3, att(γ
1
1 , δ
1
1), . . . , att(γ
1
k1
, δ1k1)
att(γ21 , δ
2
1), . . . , att(γ
2
k2
, δ2k2)
att(η21 , θ
2
1), . . . , att(η
2
j2
, θ2j2)
. . .
att(ηn1 , θ
n
1 ), . . . , att(η
n
jn
, θnjn)
−→ bad
and a substitution σ3 where Pre3σ3 =
left Pre′2σ2 and
u′′i σ2 = C
′′
i [γ
i
1, . . . , γ
i
ki
]σ3 for each i ∈ {1 ; 2}, αiσ2 =
Ci[η
i
1, . . . , η
i
ji
]σ3 for each i ≥ 2 and the δij, θ
i
j are any terms.
We have:
uσ = C′[u′1, . . . , u
′
n]σ1
= C′[f(u′′1 , u
′′
2), u
′
2, . . . , u
′
n]σ2
= C′[f(C′′1 [(γ
1
i )1≤i≤k1 ], C
′′
2 [(γ
2
i )1≤i≤k2 ],
C2[(η
2
i )1≤i≤j2 ], . . . , Cn[(η
n
i )1≤i≤kn ]]σ3
= C[(γ1i )1≤i≤k1 , (γ
2
i )1≤i≤k2 , (η
2
i )1≤i≤j2 , . . . , (η
n
i )1≤i≤kn ]σ3
Moreover, as u′iσ1 = αiσ2 for each i ≥ 2, we have:
Pre2σ2 =
left Pre1σ1, att(u
′
2, v
′
2)σ1, . . . , att(u
′
n, v
′
n)σ1
=left Pre′2σ2, att(α2, β2)σ2, . . . , att(αn, βn)σ2
28
so Pre1σ1 =
left Pre′2σ2 =
left Pre3σ3. As Pre1σ1 = Preσ
we get Preσ =left Pre3σ3. It concludes the proof. 
Lemma 2: Let P be a protocol type-compliant
w.r.t. (TP , δP), and Q be another protocol. Let Θ be the
following planning system:
〈Fact0,Fact(P ,Q),R〉
where R = Concrete+(RuleA ∪ Flat(Rule(P ,Q))).
Let (tr, φ) ∈ traceΣ(P ) for some φ and such that:
• tr only contains simple recipes;
• (tr, φ) is well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP);
• (tr, ψ) ∈ traceΣ(Q) for some ψ.
Then, there exist a planning path r1, . . . , rn of
some length n from Fact(P ,Q) to some Sn such that
Fact(K ′P ,K
′
Q) ↑ Sn where K
′
P (resp. K
′
Q) is the resulting
configuration starting from P (resp. Q) and executing tr.
Conversely, let r1, . . . , rn be a planning path from
Fact(P ,Q) to Sn such that bad 6∈ Sn. Then, there exist a
trace tr, and frames φ and ψ such that:
• tr only contains simple recipes;
• (tr, φ) is well-typed w.r.t. (TP , δP);
• (tr, ψ) ∈ traceΣ(Q) for some ψ; and
• Fact(K ′P ,K
′
Q) ↑ Sn where K
′
P (resp. K
′
Q) is the
resulting configuration starting from P (resp. Q) and
executing tr.
Proof. (⇒) We show this result by induction on the length
of tr.
Base case. The trace is empty, and the empty planning path
can be used to establish the result.
Inductive case. tr = tr′.α with α = out(c,w) or α = in(c, R).
We apply our induction hypothesis on tr′ and we obtain a
planning path r1, . . . , rn from Fact(KP ,KQ) to some Sn.
Let K ′P (resp. K
′
Q) the resulting configuration starting from
P (resp. Q) and executing tr′. Similarly, let K ′′P (resp. K
′′
Q)
the resulting configuration starting from P (resp. Q) and
executing tr′.α. Thanks to our induction hypothesis, we have
that Fact(K ′P ,K
′
Q) ↑ Sn. We have also that K
′
P
α
−→ K ′′P
and K ′Q
α
−→ K ′′Q, and therefore K
′
P = (P
′; σ′P ; φ
′) con-
tains a simple process of the form P = out(c, u).P ′ and
K ′Q = (Q
′; σ′Q; ψ
′) contains a simple process of the form
Q = out(c, v).Q′ (and similarly in case of an input). More-
over, we know that uσ′P and vσ
′
Q are messages.
Let R be the abstract protocol rule corresponding to this
step.
We consider the case of an output. We have that R ∈
Rule(P ,Q) and this rule is of the form:
St(P,Q) −→ att(u, v), St(P ′, Q′); St(P,Q)
Now, we consider the concrete instance that corresponds to the
execution mentioned above, i.e. the one obtained by applying
σ′P ⊎ σ
′
Q. This will allow us to conclude.
We now consider the case of an input, i.e. P = in(c, u).P ′
and Q = in(c, v).Q′. We have that R ∈ Rule(P ,Q) and this
rule is of the form:
St(P,Q), att(u, v) −→ St(P ′, Q′); St(P,Q)
We know that Rφ′↓ = uσ′P and Rψ
′↓ = vσ′Q with R a
simple recipe. R is a constructor on destructor recipe, so there
is a constructor context C such that R = C[R1, . . . , Rn]
where R1, . . . , Rn are destructor-only recipes. So uσ
′
P =
C[R1φ
′↓, . . . , Rnφ′↓] and vσ′Q = C[R1ψ
′↓, . . . , Rnψ′↓]. So
it is possible to apply Lemma 12. There exists a rule r′ ∈
Flat(r):
r′ = Pre′, att(u′1, v
′
1), . . . , att(u
′
n, v
′
n) −→ Add
′;Del′
and σ′ a grounding substitution for r′ such that:
1) δP(xσ
′)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r′);
2) (Pre′, Add′, Del′)σ′ = (Pre,Add,Del)(σ′P ⊎σ
′
Q); and
3) att(uσ′P , vσ
′
Q) = att(C[u
′
1, . . . , u
′
n], C[v
′
1, . . . , v
′
n])σ
′.
R1, . . . , Rn are destructor-only recipes such that
att(Riφ↓, Riψ↓) unifies with att(u′i, v
′
i). Thanks to Lemma 1,
for each Ri there is an associated plan πi containing only
adversary rules such that att(Riφ↓, Riψ↓) is in the final
state of πi. As the adversary rules delete nothing, these plans
are composable together. They give π = π1. . . . .πn. As the
att(Riφ↓, Riψ↓) unify with Pre(r
′), there is a rule r′′ in
Concrete+(r′) such that its preconditions are exactly the
att(Riφ↓, Riψ↓).
This allows us to conclude.
(⇐) We show this result by induction on the length of the
planning path.
Base case. Obvious.
Inductive case. We have a planning path r1, . . . , rn. Thanks
to our induction hypothesis, we know that the result holds for
r1, . . . , rn−1 and therefore the existence of a trace tr. Then,
we distinguish several cases depending on the rule rn. In case
rn is an instance of Concrete
+(RuleA), we consider tr again.
The case where rn is a rule that adds bad is impossible since
bad 6∈ Sn. Now, if rn is an instance of an abstract rule in
Flat(Rule(P ,Q)). Let Rf be the flattened abstract rule, and R
the abstract protocol rule.
In case R is a rule corresponding to the case of an output,
then rn is an instance of R since the flattening does not
produce any other rule. In such a case, we can mimick this
step by considering tr.out(c,w).
In case R is a rule corresponding to an input, then rn is an
instance of a rule Rf ∈ Flat(R). We have that Rf is of the
form:
StcP,Q(θP , θQ), att(u1, v1), . . . , att(uk, vk) −→ St
c
P ′,Q′(θP ′ , θQ′)
and rn is an instance of Rf(σP ∪σQ) where σP (resp. σQ) is
the substitution obtained after executing tr. Let τP , and τQ be
grounding substitution such that rn = (Rf (σP∪σQ))(τP∪τQ).
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We know that there exist destructor only recipes R1, . . . , Rk
such that Riφ↓ = uiσP τP and Riψ↓ = viσQτQ by Lemma 1.
We can apply Lemma 13 on rule rn written as:
rn = state, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(un, vn) −→ Add;Del
We are in the case where bad-flat /∈ Add, so there ex-
ists a constructor context C and a substitution τ such that
Rf (σP ∪ σQ)τ = state, att(u, v) −→ Add;Del where u =
C[u1, . . . , un] and v = C[v1, . . . , vn].
Therefore, consider the trace tr · in(c, C[R1, . . . , Rk]). This
step can be done on the P side, as well as in the Q side.
Hence, the result. 
Theorem 3: Let P a protocol type-compliant w.r.t.
(TP , δP), and Q be another protocol. We consider the fol-
lowing set R of concrete rules:
R = Concrete(RuleA ∪ flat(Rule(P ,Q))) ∪R
test
fail ∪R
atom
fail
Let Θ = 〈Fact0,Fact(P ,Q),R〉 and Π = 〈Θ, {bad}〉. We
have that P 6⊑ Q if, and only if, Π has a solution.
Proof. We show the two directions separately.
(⇒) In case P 6⊑ Q, we know thanks to Theorem 2 that
there exists a witness of this fact such that (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) is
quasi-well-typed, only involve the constants we consider here.
Moreover, tr is made of simple recipes. We consider such
a witness of minimal length, and we distinguish two cases
depending on the fact that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) for some ψ or
not. If not, we let tr−1 the trace tr without its last element,
ortherwise tr−1 = tr.
Lemma 2 allows us to conclude that there exists a plan-
ning path r1, . . . , rn from Fact(P ,Q) to Sn such that
Fact(K ′P ,K
′
Q) ↑ Sn where K
′
P (resp. K
′
Q) is the resulting
configuration starting from P (resp. Q) and executing tr−1.
In case (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q), we know that φ 6⊑s ψ, and
thanks to Proposition 1, we will obtain a planning path that
we can concatenate to r1, . . . , rn to conclude.
Otherwise, we have that (tr−1, ψ−1) ∈ trace(Q) but the
last action α can not be performed. In case α = out(c,w).
If such an action can not be performed, it means that this
action is not available in the process or would lead to output
a term that is not a message. In the first case, we have an
abstract protocol rule R that can be instantiated to mimick
this step. In the second case, we have to consider the instance
in Concrete−(R). Note that for such a rule Flat(R) = R.
Now, in case α = in(c, R). If such an action can not be
performed, it means that either this action is not syntactically
available in the process or the term in the Q side does not
match. In both case, we have an abstract protocol rule in Rf ∈
R that corresponds to this step.
First of all, remind that R is a simple recipe: R =
C[R1, . . . , Rk] where R1, . . . , Rk are destructor-only recipes
and C a constructor context built on Σc only. Thanks to
Lemma 1, for each Ri there is an associated plan πi containing
only adversary rules such that att(Riφ↓, Riψ↓) is in the final
state of πi. As the adversary rules delete nothing, these plans
are composable together. They give π = π1. . . . .πk. We call
S′n the resulting state.
If the input is not syntactically available in the process, then
Rf is of the form St(P,Q), att(u, y) −→ bad-proto where y
is a fresh variable. St(P,Q) unifies with some fact of S′n by
induction hypothesis (we arrived at this step). So we call σ
the substitution such that:
• St(P,Q)σ ∈ S′n.
• Rφ↓ = uσ
• δP(xσ)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(Rf )
• Rψ↓ = yσ
There exists such a σ because we arrived at step (induction
hypothesis: item 1), the input passes in the P side (item 2,3)
and y is a fresh variable.
We can apply Lemma 12. We get a rule r′ ∈ Flat(Rf ):
r′ = Pre′, att(u′1, v
′
1), . . . , att(u
′
k, v
′
k) −→ Add
′;Del′
and a grounding substitution σ′ such that:
• δP(xσ
′)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r′).
• (Pre′, Add′, Del′)σ′ = (St(P,Q), bad-proto, ∅)σ
• att(u, v)σ = att(C[u′1, . . . , u
′
n], C[v
′
1, . . . , v
′
n)σ
′
As the att(Riφ↓, Riψ↓) unify with Pre(r′), there is a rule
r′′ in Concrete+(r′) such that its preconditions are exactly the
att(Riφ↓, Riψ↓). This concludes the case where the input is
not syntactically available in the process.
We consider the case where there is an input in the Q side:
Q = in(c, v).Q′ ∈ Q′, but the recipe R is such that Rψ↓ does
not unify with v. In this case, we write Rf = Pre, att(u, v) −→
Add;Del.
First, assume that v does not unify with C. We call σ
a substitution such that uσ = Rφ↓ which is grounding for
vars left(Rf ) with δP(xσ)  δP(x) for each x ∈ vars left(Rf )
(it exists by induction hypothesis because we arrived at this
step). We apply Lemma 16 and we get a r′ ∈ Flat(R) and a
σ′ with:
r′ = Pre′, att(u′1, v1), . . . att(u
′
k, vk) −→ bad-flat
and u′iσ
′ = Riφ↓, Pre′σ′ =left Preσ.
We have proven that we have facts in S′n that unify at left
with r′σ. Then either they unify with r′σ and then there is a
rule r′′ ∈ Concrete+(r′) that allows to reach bad-flat, or they
do not unify at left with r′σ, and we get a r′′ ∈ Concrete−(r′)
that allows to reach bad-concrete. In both cases, we reach bad.
Now, assume that v does unify with the context C. There
is a σ grounding for Rf such that vσ = C[v1, . . . , vn],
uσ = C[u1, . . . , un] and δP(xσP )  δP(x) for each x ∈
vars left(Rf ). So we can apply Lemma 12 and we get a
r′ ∈ Flat(Rf ):
r′ = Pre′, att(u′1, v
′
1), . . . , att(u
′
n, v
′
n) −→ Add
′;Del′
and a σ′ such that:
1) δP(xσ
′)  δP(x) for any x ∈ vars left(r′);
2) (Pre′, Add′, Del′)σ′ = (Pre,Add,Del)σ; and
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3) att(u, v)σ = att(C[u′1, . . . , u
′
n], C[v
′
1, . . . , v
′
n])σ
′.
We have that there is some fact unifying at left with
Pre′σ′ = Preσ in S′n by induction hypothesis, and the
Riφ↓ unify with the ui, but the Riψ↓) do not unify with
the vi by hypothesis. So there is a r
′′ ∈ Concrete−(r′) whose
precondition are true. It concludes this case and therefore the
proof.
(⇐) We show this result by induction on the length of plan-
ning path leading to bad. We consider one of minimal length.
We have that π = r1, . . . , rn, and we can apply Lemma 2 on
r1, . . . , rn−1, we obtain tr. This trace allows us to reach the
configurations (P ′, σP′ , φ′) and (Q′, σQ′ , ψ′). We call Sn−1
the set of fluents resulting from this planning path, and Sn
the set resulting from r1, . . . , rn. Now, we distinguish several
cases depending on whether rn is in Concrete
−(RuleA) ∪
Rtestfail ∪ R
atom
fail or in Concrete(Flat(Rule(P ,Q)). In the first
case, we conclude relying on Proposition 1, and therefore we
obtain that the frames resulting from the execution of tr are
not in static inclusion.
The second case occurs when rn ∈
Concrete(Flat(Rule(P ,Q))). So there is a Rf such that
rn ∈ Concrete(Flat(Rf )).
This rule cannot come from the first item of the protocol
rules definition, so it comes either from the second or from
the third.
We first consider the case where it comes from the second.
Then, there is no flattening on those rules. Therefore: rn ∈
Concrete(Rf). We write:
Rf = St(P,Q) −→ Add;Del
rn = f0 −→ Addn;Deln
for some Add,Del, Addn, Deln sets of facts and f0 ∈ Sn−1.
As rn ∈ Concrete(Rf ) is applicable, St(P,Q) unifies with
f0 ∈ Sn−1 by induction hypothesis: call σ a substitu-
tion such that St(P,Q)σ = f0. (Add,Del) unifies at left
with (Addn, Deln) through σ. If it unifies at right, then
rn ∈ Concrete
+(Rf ). Therefore Del = ∅ and Add =
att(u, c⋆0), bad-proto. u must be instanciated by a message as
rn exists and is applicable. So in P ′ there is a process P on
some channel c that begins with an output but the process in
Q′ on channel c does not begin by an output. Moreover, it is
possible to make this output, so tr.out(c,w) is a witness of
non-inclusion.
If it does not unify at right, then rn ∈ Concrete
−(Rf ).
Assume Rf = St(P,Q) −→ att(u, c
⋆
0), bad-proto. Then by def-
inition of Concrete− we deduce that uσ is a message but c⋆0 is
not. So this case never happens. We get that Rf = St(P,Q) −→
att(u, v), St(P ′, Q′); St(P,Q). As St(P,Q)σ ∈ Sn−1, we
must have that uσ is a message but vσ is not. So the output is
possible in the P side, but not in the Q side. This concludes
the case of the second item of protocol rules definition.
Only the third item remains to be considered. We write:
Rf = St(P,Q), att(u, v) −→ Add;Del
rn = f0, att(t1, t
′
1), . . . , att(tk, t
′
k) −→ Addn;Deln
where f0 unifies at left with St(P,Q) and the ti, t
′
i are
messages. We have that bad ∈ Addn. As rn is applicable,
there are recipes R1, . . . , Rk such that Riφ
′↓ = ti and
Riψ
′↓ = t′i for each i by Lemma 1.
Moreover, the form of the rule indicates that there is some
process P = in(c, u).P ′ ∈ P ′ and Q is the process on channel
c in Q′. We distinguish three cases according to the origin of
this bad:
First case. It is bad-proto. Then the only possibility
is that Rf = St(P,Q), att(u, x) −→ bad-proto where x
is a fresh variable. We have rn ∈ Concrete
+(Flat(Rf ))
(Concrete− would give bad-concrete) so there is a rule r′ =
f ′0, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(uk, vk)) −→ Add
′;Del′ ∈ Flat(Rf )
such that rn ∈ Concrete
+(r′). In particular there is a σ0 such
that rn = r
′σ0 and f
′
0σ0 = f0, uiσ0 = ti and viσ0 = t
′
i
for each i. So bad-flat /∈ Add′. We apply Lemma 13, there
is a constructor context C and a substitution τ such that
Rfτ = f
′
0, att(u, v) −→ Add;Del and u = C[u1, . . . , uk] and
v = C[v1, . . . , vk].
The att(ti, t
′
i) are in Sn−1. So by Lemma 1, there are
destructor only recipes R1, . . . , Rk such that Riφ
′↓ = ti and
Riψ
′↓ = t′i.
So it means that tr.in(c, C[R1, . . . , Rk]) is a trace of P but
it is not a trace of Q because there is no input in Q′.
Second case. It is bad-flat. We have rn ∈
Concrete+(Flat(Rf )) (Concrete
− would give bad-concrete)
So there is a rule
r′ = f ′0, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(uk, vk) −→ bad-flat; ∅ ∈ Flat(Rf )
and a substitution σ such that rn = r
′σ. So we apply
Lemma 13, and we get that there exists a constructor context
C a substitution τ , a term v′ and two sets Add0 and Del0
such that
Rfτ = f
′
0, att(C[u1, . . . , un], v
′) −→ Add0;Del0
but v′ does not unify with C.
So tr.in(c, C[R1, . . . , Rk]) is a trace of P , but it is not a
trace of Q (either there was no input in Q or there is an
input but it does not unify with C[R1, . . . , Rk]ψ
′↓). It gives a
witness of non-inclusion.
Third case. It is bad-concrete. We have
rn ∈ Concrete
−(Flat(Rf )) (Concrete
+ would not give
bad-concrete). So there is a rule
r′ = f ′0, att(u1, v1), . . . , att(uk, vk) −→ Add
′;Del′ ∈ Flat(Rf )
for some Add′, Del′ and a substitution σ such that rn =
left
r′σ, but rn and r
′ do not unify at right.
In both cases of Lemma 13, we get a constructor con-
text C, a substitution τ and two sets Add0, Del0 such that
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Rfτ = St(P,Q), att(u
′, v′) −→ Add0;Del0 where u =
C[u1, . . . , uk].
So tr.in(c, C[R1, . . . , Rk]) is a valid trace of P (we have
C[R1, . . . , Rk]φ
′↓ = u′ = uτ ).
Moreover, C[R1ψ
′↓, . . . , Rkψ′↓] does not unify with v, (as
rn ∈ Concrete
−(r′)). So tr.in(c, C[R1, . . . , Rk]) is not a trace
of Q, which gives a witness of non-inclusion.
It concludes the proof.

32
